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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
THE ECONOMIC AND  SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
AND  THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS ENSURiNG SECURITY AND TRUST IN ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATiON 
TOWARDS A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL SIGNATURES AND ENCRYPT~ON 
!ntll'oductiolll 
Open  electronic  networks  such  as  the 
Internet  are  increasingly  being  used  as  a 
platform  for  communication  in  our  society. 
They  have  the  capacity  to  create  new 
businesses,  new  channels  of  distribution 
and  new methods of reaching the  customer. 
They  also  open  up  opportunities  to  re-
engineer  business  conduct  itself.  It  is  now 
largely  expected  that  electronic  commerce 
will  be  one  of  the  key  drivers  for  the 
development  of  the  global  information 
society.  Electronic  Commerce  presents  the 
European  Union  with  an  excellent 
opportunity  to  advance  its  economic 
integration by  means of a "virtual" economic 
area. 
However,  the  realisation  of  such 
developments are hampered  by  the  noticed 
insecurities  typical  to  open  networks: 
messages  can  be  intercepted  and 
manipulated,  the  validity  of documents  can 
be  denied,  personal  data  can  be  illicitly 
collected. As a result, the attractiveness and 
advantage  of  electronic  commerce  and 
communication cannot be fully exploited. 
In  order  to  make  good  use  of  the 
commercial  opportunities  offered  by 
electronic  communication  via  open 
networks, a more secure environment needs 
to  be  established.  Cryptographic 
technologies  are  widely  recognised  as 
essential tools for security and trust on open 
networks.  Two  important  applications  of 
cryptography  are  digital  signatures  and 
encryption. 
Several  Member  States  announced  their 
intentions to  introduce specific regulation  on 
cryptography  and  some  already  have  done 
so.  For instance, Germany and  Italy already 
moved ahead with  digital signature laws.  In 
other  Member  States  internal  discussions 
are  taking  place,  and  some  tend  to  refrain, 
at  least for  the  moment,  from  any  specific 
regulation at all. 
Divergent  and  restrictive  practices  with 
regard to cryptography can be detrimental to 
the  free  circulation  of  goods  and  services 
within  the  Internal  Market  and  hinder  the 
development of electronic  commerce.  The 
European  Union  simply  cannot  afford  a 
divided  regulatory  landscape  in  a  field  so 
vital for the economy and society. 
The  main  objectives  of this  Communication 
are  to  develop  a  European  policy  in 
particular  with  a  view  to  establishing  a 
common  framework  for  digital  signatures, 
ensuring  the  functioning  of  the  Internal 
Market  for  cryptographic  services  and 
products,  stimulating  a  European  industry 
for cryptographic services and  products and 
stimulating  and  enabling  users  in  all 
economical  sectors  to  benefit  from  the 
opportunities  of  the  global  information 
society.  As  far  as  timing  is  concerned,  the 
Commission  considers  that  appropriate 
measures  ought  to  be  in  place  throughout 
the Union  by the year 2000 at the latest.  As 
a consequence,  the  Commission  intends to 
come  forward  with  detailed  proposals  in 
1998 after the assessment of comments on 
this Communication. 
This  is  in  line  with  the  April  1997  adopted 
Communication  on  >:lectronic  Commerce, 
where  the  Commission  announced  the 
intention  to  prepare  a  policy  aiming  at 
guaranteeing  the  free  movement  of 
encryption  technologies  and  products,  as 
well  as  to  propose  a  specific  initiative  on 
digital signatures. 
Some Member States are in  the  process  of 
introducing  voluntary  schemes,  others  of 
mandatory  licensing  schemes  to  build  trust 
in  Certification  Authorities  (CAs)  and  to 
encourage  legal  recognition  of  digital 
signatures.  Whilst  the  development  of  a 
clear  framework  is  welcomed,  different 
national regulatory approaches and  the lack 
of  mutual  recognition  of  each  others' 
regulatory  requirements  may  easily  lead, 
due  to  the  inherent  cross-border  nature  of 
digital  signatures,  to  a fragmentation  of the 1.•,-
f'  '.'~ 
tt  c~~::: ~l~. •  ? s  \.<~P  ~~'..:">  l.)  ic·ci!i':-.::.~c::  Li12  u.:.:~  ,J; 
c:i~:i  .. ::- 1  .sl£J!:::·~~-:,· :.~  ~.  e;.-c~;:~·  1·1c  jc~Jc:l  :Jo:c:s~·s~ c 
col·n,·.~:On  t:::·s:::·l  (~-z·;Y13\  .. ,01'
1 ~  8l  (:o:~tFt'll11li;_~t 
k.Ne:  is  ur~;;ariliV  ,,a2c~2C:.  rsguiEl\ion  in 
t:1e  nsi( o'i di~;;ii:cl  ~;i£,18i:l:~·as  ;{lUSt r.188(  t'· 1C 
r1?i11  ,·cc~L;i,-z,!1ent·s:  creaie.  2  clec:J" 
fra,lc'•'Oik \o  :)u!lc:  trust in  digital signaLutss 
011  one side and bs ilexii)le enough lo react 
to  ne\·'' technical developments on  the other 
side. 
Stimulated  by  the  rapid  expansion  of  the 
internet  encryption  will  become  an  integral 
part  of  personal  and  business  computing. 
Electronic commerce as  well as many other 
applications  of  the  information  society  will 
only receive acceptance and will only unfold 
their  economic  and  social  benefits  if 
confidentiality  can  be  assured  in  a  user-
friendly  and  cost-efficient  way.  In  open 
net<vorks,  encryption  of  dota  is  1161",'  often 
thz  only  effective  and  cost-efficient  way  of 
protecting  confidentiality  of  data  and 
communications. 
LB''"  enforcement  authorities  and  national 
securi!y  agsncies e;re  concemed  thai \"'ide-
spread use or encrypted communication will 
diminish  their  capability  to  fight  against 
crime  or  prevent  criminal  and  terrorist 
activities.  For  this  reason,  there  are 
reflections  in  several  Member  States  to 
establish  regulation  on  cryptography,  in 
addition  to  controls  on  export  and  intra-
Community  shipments.  This  has  led  to  a 
discussion  about  the  need,  technical 
possibilities,  effectiveness,  proportionality 
and privacy implications of such regulations. 
However,  nobody  can  be  effectively 
prevented from encrypting data (criminals or 
terrorists  also  can  use  encryption  for  their 
activities),  e.g.  by  simply  downloading 
strong encryption software from the Internet. 
As a result restricting the  use  of encryption 
could  well  prevent  law-abiding  companies 
and  citizens  from  protecting  themselves 
against  crimina!  attacks.  It  would  not 
hovve11er  pre~'ent totally c1iminals from  using 
ti1ese technologies. 
Proposals for  regulation or encr;r;:>tion  hsvs 
generated  considerable  controversy. 
Industry  expresses  major  concerns  about 
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-:-he  at  European  level  urgently  nseded 
framework  should  include  common  legal 
requirements for CAs (in  particular common 
requirements  for  the  establishment  and 
operation o'f  CAs) allowing certificates to  be 
recognised in all Member States. 
In  addition,  the Commission will  monitor the 
legal  developments  in  Member  States 
introducing  new  legislation  with  the  aim  to 
respect  tntemal  Market  principles  and  will 
encourage  Member  States  to  rapidly 
implement  appropriate  measures  to  build 
trust in digital signatures. 
in  order  1o  achieve  as  wide  as  possible 
accepta,lce  or  digital  signatures  iViember 
States  should  co-ordinate  activities  to 
ensure legal recognition of digital signatures 
at  the  latest  by  the  year  2000.  The 
Commission  will  evaluate  the  necessiiy  to 
provide  for  (he  legal  ~ecognition  of digital 
signatures  at  Community  level  by 
harmonising  different  national  regulation 
(e.g. form requirements, evidence rules). 
The Community and  Member States should 
take  part  in  or  initiate  a  dialogue  with 
international  organisations,  such  as  the 
OECD,  the  United  Nations  and  the  WfO, 
notably  to  establish  common  technical 
standards  and  mutual  recognition  of 
regulations. 
Po!icy a1c~ioi11s ~Ul  ·~:roe <ilU'®r:,;  1:)\P 
®lliCi1f[O~iOIIlil 
The  EC  Treaty  and  the  Treaty  on  the 
European  Union  fully  respect  the 
competence  of Member States  with  regard 
to national security and law enforcement. 
io  snsure  that  thz  0evelopmen::  oi 
electronic  commerce  in  !he  Internal  i''larket 
is  not  hindered  and  co  raciiitale  tile  ·rree 
circulation  211d  use  of encryption  products 
and  services  the  Commission  c2.lls  upon 
II  I b Member  States  to  avoid  disproportionate 
restrictions.  fllloreover the  Commission  will 
e)(amine  whether  resti·ictions  are  totally  or 
partially justified, notably with respect to: 
'  the  free  circulation  provisions  of  tha 
Treaty,  in  particular Aliicles  30,  36,  52, 
56 and 59, 
o  the principle of proportionality, 
g  the  Council  Directive  83/189/EEC  of 
28.3.1993  laying  down  a  procedure  for 
the provision of information in the field of 
technical standards and regulations and 
o  the EU  Directive 95/46/EC of 24.1 0. 95 on 
the protection of personal data. 
The Commission also believes that it will  be 
important  for  Member States  to  distinguish 
"digital  signature services"  from  "encryption 
services",  because  different  rules  and 
different goals separate  these two aspects. 
Additional measures: 
o  Adapting  the  Dual  Use  Regulation  (CE) 
3381/94  in  view  of the  requirements  for 
the cryptographic products market; 
o  Improving  the  co-operation  of  police 
forces  on  a  European  and  international 
level; 
o  Working  towards  international 
agreements between tl1e  Community and 
other  countries  because  of  the  global 
dimension  of electronic  communications 
and commerce. 
o  Encouraging  industry  and  international 
standards  organisations  to  develop 
interoperable technical and  infrastructure 
standards  for  digital  signatures  and 
encryption  to  ensure  secure  and 
trustworthy use of networks. 
o  Proposal  of  a  Council  and  Parliament 
Decision for an  INFOSEC  II  programme 
building  on  the  INFOSEC  programme 
carried out from  1992 until  1994. Such a 
programme  would  aim  at  developing 
overall  strategies  for  the  security  of 
electronic  communications,  in  particular 
with  a  view  to  provide  the  user  with 
appropriate protection systems. 
"  Continuing  of the  current projects  in  the 
field  of digital  signatures  and  encryption 
within  the  4th  framework  programme for 
Community  activities  in  the  field  of 
research  and  technological  development 
(1994  - 1998)  and  launching  of  new 
projects  within  the  5th  frameiJ·Iork 
programme (1998- 2002). 
"  Support  of the  use  of digital  signatures 
and  encryption  in  EU  se1vices  and 
government administrations. 
o  Setting  up  of  an  European  Internet-
Forum in  1997 as a means to inform and 
exchange  information  on  the  regulatory 
and use aspects of digital signatures and 
encryption. 
o  Organisation  of an  international  hearing 
on  "digital  signature  and  encryption" 
beginning of 1998. 
Timeframe. 
4.0./1997: · European Internet-Forum  .. 
'  ' 
4.Q./1997:  Commission proposal to ~mend  the 
Dual-Use Regulation 
1.0./1998:  l,ntemational hearing 
i.Q./1998:  Assessment ofthe· comments on 
the Communication, the results  of 
the Internet-Forum and the· 
international hearing 
2.Q./1998:  Proposal for further action (e.g. 
Directive on digital signatures) 
2.Q./i998:  Proposal for an lnf()sec II 
programme 
1998-2002:  Projects within the 5th framework 
programme 
by 2000:  Common framework on  . 
cryptography put in place throughout 
the Union 
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Open  networks  such  as  the  Internet  are 
increasingly  being  used  as  a  platform  for 
communication  in  our  society.  Open  and 
accessible,  they  allow  rapid  and  efficient 
world-wide exchanges at low cost.  This will 
lead to  new forms of business configuration 
(e.g.  "virtual" enterprises, work collaboration 
across the  globe),  of private communication 
(e.g.  e-mail)  and  of  organisation  of  public 
services (e.g. electronic tax declaration). 
Open  networks  also  have  the  capacity  to 
offer  substantial  opportunities  for  global 
electronic commerce  in  goods and  services 
which can  be ordered,  supplied and  paid  for 
electronically.  Already  today,  software 
packages,  information,  music,  and  videos 
are  being  delivered  over  the  Internet.  It  is 
now  largely  expected  that  electronic 
commerce will  be  one  of the  key  drivers for 
the  development  of  the  global  information 
society
1
. 
Overall, the increasing use of open networks 
offers  the  possibility  to  create  new 
businesses,  new  channels  of  distribution 
and new methods of reaching the customer. 
It also opens up opportunities to re-engineer 
business conduct itself. 
However,  the  realisation  of  such 
developments are  hampered  by  the  noticed 
insecurities  typical  to  open  networks: 
messages  can  be  intercepted  and 
manipulated,  the  validity  of documents  can 
be  denied,  personal  data  can  be  illicitly 
collected.  Fraud  is  already  increasing  in 
several  forms.  Therefore,  today,  important 
electronic  documents  are  usually  only 
exchanged  in  so-called  "closed  networks", 
that  is,  involving  users  between  whom 
contractual  relationships  and  mutual  trust 
already  exist.  This  model  cannot  be 
transferred to open networks because of the 
absence  of  such  relationships  between 
users.  As  a  result,  the  attractiveness  and 
advantage  of  electronic  commerce  and 
communication cannot be fully exploited. 
In  order  to  make  good  use  of  the 
commercial  opportunities  offered  by 
electronic  communication  via  open 
' Communication of the Commission "A European 
Initiative in Electronic Commerce" (COM(97)157 final, 
16.4.97), http://www.ispo.cec.be/Ecommerce. 
networks,  a  secure  and  trustworthy 
environment  is  therefore  necessary. 
Cryptographic  technologies  are  nowadays 
widely  recognised  as  the  essential  tool  for 
security  and  trust  in  electronic 
communication.  Two  important applications 
of  cryptography  are  digital  signatures  and 
encryption.  Digital  signatures  can  help  to 
prove the  origin of data (authentication) and 
verify  whether  data  has  been  altered 
(integrity).  Encryption can  help keeping  data 
and communication confidential. 
Several  Member  States  announced  their 
intentions to  introduce specific regulation on 
cryptography  and  some  have  already  done 
so.  For example, Germany and Italy already 
moved  ahead  with  digital  signature  laws.  In 
other  Member  States  internal  discussions 
are  taking  place,  and  some  tend  to  refrain, 
at least  for  the  moment,  from  any  specific 
regulation at all. 
Divergent  legal  and  technical  approaches 
would  constitute  a  serious  obstacle  to  the 
Internal  Market  and  would  hinder  the 
development  of  new  economic  activities 
linked to electronic commerce. An  EU  policy 
framework for ensuring security  and  trust in 
electronic communication  and  safeguarding 
the  functioning  of  the  Internal  Market  is 
therefore  urgently  needed.  The  European 
Union  simply  cannot  afford  a  divided 
regulatory  landscape  in  a  field  so  vital  for 
the economy and society. 
As  cryptographic services and  products are 
more  and  more  demanded,  concerns  are 
expressed  that  abuse  of  cryptography  by 
criminals  or  terrorists  would  make  it 
increasingly  difficult to  combat crime.  Such 
concerns  apply  only  to  confidentiality 
services.  Digital signatures do  not pose any 
risk for  law  enforcement,  since  they  do  not 
prevent  data  from  being  read.  Digital 
signatures  could  even  bring  significant  law 
enforcement  benefits  as  they  allow  for 
example  messages  to  be  attributed  to  a 
particular  reader  and/or  sender.  As,  in 
addition,  they  need  a  specific  regulatory 
framework  to  take  into  account  their  legal 
implications,  the  present  Communication 
distinguishes  between  authentication  and 
integrity services - digital signatures (part II) 
and  confidentiality  services  - encryption 
(part lllf 
2 This distinction is also stated clearly in the OECD 
Guidelines for Cryptography Policy, 27.3.97; 
http://www.oecd.org/dsti/iccp/crypto_e.html In  September  1996,  the  European 
Parliament  invited  the  Commission  to 
prepare  legal  EU  provisions  concerning 
information  security  and  confidentiality, 
digital identification as well as the protection 
of privacy
3  In  November 1996 the  Council 
of Ministers  requested  the  Member  States 
and  the  Commission  to  prepare  consistent 
measures  to  ensure  the  integrity  and 
authentication  of  electronically  transmitted 
documents
4  In  March  1997  the  OECD 
adopted  Guidelines for cryptography  policy, 
setting  out  principles  to  guide  countries  in 
formulating  their own  policies related  to  the 
use  of  cryptography.  These  Guidelines  -
although  non-binding  - present  the  first 
attempt  at  international  level  to  give  policy 
orientations  on  several  aspects  of 
cryptography,  including both encryption  and 
digital  signatures.  The  Bonn  Ministerial 
Declaration  of July  1997  also  stressed  the 
necessity of a legal and technical framework 
for  digital  signatures  at  European  level  as 
well  as  the  importance  of the  availability  of 
strong  encryption  technology  for  electronic 
commerce5. 
In  its  April  1997  Communication  on 
Electronic  Commerce,  the  Commission 
announced  the intention to  prepare a policy 
aiming  at  guaranteeing  the  free  movement 
of encryption  technologies  and  products  as 
well  as  to  propose  a  specific  initiative  on 
digital signatures. As announced the present 
Communication  aims  at  developing  such  a 
policy framework with a view to: 
o  establishing  a  European  framework  for 
digital signatures; 
o  ensuring  the  functioning  of  the  Internal 
Market  for  cryptographic  products  and 
services  as  well  as  products  and 
services  incorporating  cryptographic 
techniques,  while  respecting  public 
security  concerns  and  contributing  to  a 
homogenous security area  in  the  EU,  as 
set  out  by  the  Amsterdam  European 
Council6; 
o  stimulating  a  European  industry  for 
cryptographic services and  products; 
'European Parliament Resolution A4-244/96, 19.9.96, 
OJ320, p.164, 28.10.96 
4 Council Resolution Nr. 96/C 376/01, 21.11.96 on new 
policy-priorities regarding the information society, OJ 
C376, 12.12.96 
5 European Ministerial Conference, Bonn 6-8.7.97, 
http://www.echo.lu/bonn/conference.html 
6 Presidency Conclusions on freedom, security and 
justice, Amsterdam European Council,  16/17.6.97 
(http://ue.eu.inUamsterdam/en/conclusi/conclusi.htm) 
o  addressing  the  international  questions 
raised by the global nature of the Internet 
and  other  electronic  networks,  in 
particular  by  removing  trade  barriers for 
cryptographic services and  products and 
achieving  as  far  as  possible  end-to-end 
communication  security  on  a  global 
scale; 
a  providing  the  basis  for  integration  of 
cryptography  within  the  framework  of 
other  European  policies  such  as 
protection  of privacy,  consumer interests 
and intellectual property rights; 
o  stimulating  and  enabling  users  in  all 
economical  sectors  to  benefit  from  the 
opportunities  of  the  global  information 
society which  can  only  be  fully  exploited 
if  based  on  a  framework  of  trust  and 
security. 
Discussions  about  the  possible  conflict 
between divergent interests on security have 
shown  a  considerable  amount  of 
confrontation  and  discontent  between 
institutions  and  interest  groups.  This 
Communication  is  therefore  also  meant  to 
contribute  to  a  better  understanding  of the 
underlying  issues  and  of  the  growing 
importance  of  cryptography  for  the 
information society. 
iji,  Authen~ication andl integ11ity: 
Digotal Signa'iuwes 
Transmitting  data  in  electronic  form  has 
many  advantages compared  with  traditional 
methods.  Documents can be made available 
almost instantly and  in  any  quantity  and  the 
recipient  is  able  to  work  on  them  directly. 
Transmission  is  considerably  cheaper  and 
faster - documents can  be  sent around  the 
globe in  a matter of seconds, without delay. 
However,  authentication  and  integrity 
services  are  needed  for  secure  and 
trustworthy  data  transmission  and 
communication over open networks. 
The speed of technological progress implies 
that many  of the  potential  application fields 
for authentication  and  integrity  services are 
difficult  to  ascertain  at  this  stage.  New 
application  areas  (e.g.  protection  of 
intellectual  property  rights,  stored  data, 
network  security  or  electronic  cash)  are 
developing  continuously.  In  particular  for 
electronic  communication  digital  signatures 
are considered to play a significant role. 
2 11.  Digital signaturre: wha~  o~ is anol 
how it works 
(i)  Several  different  methods  exist  to  sign 
documents  electronically  varying  from  very 
simple  methods  (e.g.  inserting  a  scanned 
image of a hand-written signature in  a word 
processing  document)  to  very  advanced 
methods  (e.g.  using  cryptography). 
Electronic  signatures  based  on  "public  key 
cryptography"  are  called  digital  signatures 
and  widely  considered  as  crucial  for  a 
variety  of applications  [for  a  more  detailed 
description see Annelt 1]: 
o  digital  signatures  used  for  official 
communication  with  public  institutions  (e.g. 
calls  for  tender,  exchange  of  application 
forms,  identity  documents,  tax  declarations, 
transmission of legal documents); 
o  digital  signatures  used  for  contractual 
relations  in  open  networks  (e.g.  electronic 
buying and selling, financial transactions); 
o  digital  signatures used  only for identifying or 
authorising  purposes  (to  be  certain  of  the 
identity of a correspondent or of his  specific 
attributes  e.g.  an  authorisation  to  log  into  a 
computer  system,  identification  of  Web 
servers); 
o  digital  signatures  used  in  closed  systems 
(e.g. a corporate Intranet); 
o  digital signatures used for personal purposes. 
(ii)  In electronic communication, the concept 
of digital signatures is  linked to  the  notion of 
data transmission  using a kind  of electronic 
seal  which  is  affixed  to  the  data  and  which 
allows the recipient to: 
o  verify the origin of the data, i.e. the use of 
a  key  assigned  to  a  certain  sender 
(authentication of  data source), 
o  check  that  data  are  complete  and 
unchanged  and  thereby  safeguard  their 
integrity (integrity of  data). 
Technically  speaking,  digital  signatures  are 
usually  created  and  verified  by  asymmetric 
cryptographic  techniques  similar  to  those 
used  for  encryption.  Two  complementary 
keys are  generated and  assigned to  a user. 
One  of them  - a  signature  key  - is  kept 
private  (private  key)  whereas  the  other - a 
signature  verification  key  - is  published 
(public key).  It  is  of course  crucial  that the 
private  key  cannot  be  computed  from  the 
public key. 
(iii)  Contrary  to  cryptography  used  for 
confidentiality  purposes,  digital  signatures 
are  annexed  to  the  data  and  leave  the 
content  e.g.  of  the  signed  electronic 
document  or  the  electronic  transaction 
intact.  Of course, the data can in addition be 
encrypted  as  described  and  discussed  in 
chapter Ill.  The cryptographic  technology  is 
used  to  protect  against  the  illicit  use  of 
signatures  in  an  electronic  environment. 
Technical  means  exist to  signal when  keys 
are  being  used  for functionalities other then 
the one for which ihey have been generated 
(e.g.  a  key  issued  for  authentication  for 
confidentiality purposes). 
(iv)  With the help of the sender's public key 
the recipient can  find out whether the signed 
data  has  been  altered  and  check  that  the 
public  and  private  key  of the  sender are  a 
complementary key-pair.  Even the  smallest 
change  of  the  data  would  be  discovered 
immediately. What appears to be a relatively 
complicated  mathematical  process  is  in 
practice  carried  out  in  a matter of seconds 
by  the  computer.  The  user therefore would 
not  notice  the  underlying  computing 
process. 
(v)  Verification  of  the  authenticity  and 
integrity  of data  does  not  necessarily prove 
the  identity  of the  owner of the  public  key. 
How  does  for  instance  the  recipient  of  a 
message  know that the  sender is  really  the 
one he claims to be? The public key  may be 
attached  to  the  message or be  published  in 
a  directory,  but  what  degree of confidence 
can  the  recipient have? Anyone can  publish 
a  public  key  under  another  name.  The 
recipient may therefore wish to  obtain  more 
reliable information on the identity of the key 
owner.  Such  information  can  be  given  by 
the  key  owner himself,  issuing the recipient 
with  satisfactory  proof.  Another  way  is  to 
have  it  confirmed  by  a  third-party  (e.g.  a 
person or institution mutually trusted by  both 
parties). 
In  the  context  of  digital  signatures  these 
third-parties  are  most  commonly  so-called 
certification authorities. 
2.  Certifoca~ion autlho~rities (CAs) 
The  provision  of public certification services 
is  a  completely  new  service  sector. 
Although  still  in  its  infancy  this  sector  is 
already raising a lot of interest. The sector is 
currently  dominated  by  commercial 
undertakings  based  outside  Europe, 
3 although  some
1
' European  companies  have 
also emerged.  A significant number of new 
entrants  will  appear  on  the  market  very 
rapidly.  They  seem  to  focus  on  their 
national market and do not,  at least initially, 
target markets  in  other EU  Member States. 
This  hesitation  is  also  linked  to  legal 
uncertainties. 
CAs  can  perform  a  range  of functions with 
regard  to  digital  signatures.  Sometimes, 
publications  refer to  them  as  Trusted  Third 
Parties  (TIPs).  However,  TIPs  which  in 
general  may  provide  a  wide  range  of 
services  very  often  are·  perceived  to  stand 
for  lawful  access  to  encryption  keys  [see 
AnneJt Ill]. 
While  it  is  not excluded  that TIPs also  act 
as  a CA - as  described  in  this  paper - the 
functions  of both  institutions are considered 
to be  different.  In  particular CAs are crucial 
for  digital  signatures  to  become  a  fully 
accepted tool within  national legal systems, 
for instance, to ensure legal recognition and 
enforceability  of  a  signature  in  electronic 
commerce. Therefore the  role and  the legal 
basis  for  CAs  and  TIPs  need  to  be 
distinguished from a regulatory standpoint. 
2. "i. Certification 
One  central  task of a CA is  to  authenticate 
the  ownership  and  the  characteristics  of a 
public key so that they can  be trusted.  Once 
a CA is  satisfied that the ownership and  the 
characteristics of a public signature key  are 
correct,  a certificate is  issued containing this 
key  and  other  details.  This  certificate  is 
itself digitally  signed  i.e.  the  CA  signs  the 
certificate with its private key to establish the 
correlation  with  the  key  owner.  When  the 
CA's public key is added, a simple automatic 
verification  is  possible.  However,  it  is 
necessary for the recipient to trust the CA,  in 
other words a CA must be  mutually trusted 
by both parties. 
As a result, several categories of certificates 
are  technically  conceivable,  e.g.  the  CA's 
public  key  can  be  signed  by  another  CA 
leading  to  a certification  hierarchy.  It  would 
also  be  possible  to  have  the  public  key 
certified by several different CAs. 
2.2. Possible contents of a certificate 
A  certificate  can  contain  a  whole  range  of 
informations,  going  beyond  the  mere  key 
allocation and precisely determining its use. 
Some  additional  information  will  always  be 
necessary,  e.g.  the  algorithm to  be  used  or 
the certificate expire date.  Other information 
may  be  voluntary  and  will  depend  on  the 
purpose for which the key  is to be used and 
the level of confidence or trust required of it. 
Examples of a certificate's contents: 
name or pseudonym of the signatory 
name of the CA 
public key of the signatory 
algorithm 
type of key 
o  profession 
position within an organisation (e.g. 
complementary to a "limited 
partnership", executive vice-president of 
a "corporation") 
qualification, licences (e.g. attorney, 
doctor, haulage contractor) 
official approvals (e.g. catering permit, 
vehicle driving licences) 
limits of liability (legal limits e.g. 
"commanditaire "of a "limited 
partnership" or voluntary limits) 
cover limits (e.g. insurance, deposits) 
confirmation that in the case of disputes 
pseudonyms are revealed 
certificate expire date 
This  might  lead  to  a  variety  or  different 
classes  of certificates.  For instance,  a  key 
used  to  authorise  a  large  financial  transfer 
between two  banks will  require a high  level 
of trust  whilst  one  used  to  validate  a  low 
value personal  purchase will not need to  be 
trusted to the same extent. 
2.3. Key management 
Key  management implies an  extensive task 
package,  which can  for instance include the 
generation  and  allocation  of  key-pairs,  the 
identification of the owner,  the creation of a 
public key directory and time stamping. 
(i) Key creation ancl owner identification 
The keys - which can  also be generated by 
the user himself- must be effectively unique 
and  tamper proof (which  is  practically given 
by  the  choice  of an  appropriate  key  length 
and  generation  procedure).  Otherwise  the 
digital signature cannot be allocated for legal 
relations  in  a  reliable  manner  to  data  for 
which  it  has  been  generated  and,  via  the 
key,  to  only  one  certain  person  or  entity. 
This ensures that a key  owner cannot refer 
to  the  fact  that  the  digital  signature  was 
produced  not with  his  key  but with  another 
one. 
4 Keys  may  be  allocated  to  private  persons, 
legal persons (e.g.  limited liability company) 
or  to  "entities  without  legal  status"  (e.g. 
department of an enterprise, working group). 
Keys  can  even  be  assigned  to  functional 
entities such  as  servers or PCs.  Since the 
CA must guarantee the unique link between 
a key  and  its user, it has to  identify the user 
in  a reliable way  and to  hand  out the  key  to 
the correct person. 
(ii) Key directory 
A  directory  of  public  keys  may  also  be 
created  providing  information  on  the  key 
owner,  its  validity  period  and  other details, 
such  as revocation.  The key  directory must 
always  be  kept  up-to-date.  Certificate 
revocation lists allow to determine whether a 
certificate  has  been  revoked,  suspended  or 
reactivated.  The effective operation of such 
a  facility  will  depend  on  the  speed  and 
reliability  of  the  cancellation  procedure, 
which could be used in cases of invalidity of 
the certificate or loss and  theft of the private 
key. 
(iii) Time staimping 
There are many  situations in  legal relations, 
where  proof of the  exact  time  of  a certain 
action (transmission, creation or receipt of a 
document or the time at which  a declaration 
of intent is  made)  is  crucial.  It  is  important 
to  prove  the  exact  time  when  a  key  was 
revoked to avoid liability for contracts signed 
with  a  compromised  key.  Therefore,  digital 
time-stamping  services  able  to  reliably 
confirm the exact time of certain actions will 
be  necessary.  Time  stamping  services  are 
also  crucial  for  'Intellectual  Property  Right' 
applications.  These  services  could  be 
provided  by  a  CA,  but  of  course  also  by 
another body. 
2.4. Mutual recognition 
In  a  fully  international  framework  for 
electronic  commerce  certificates  issued  by 
foreign  CAs must be  mutually recognised  in 
different  countries.  Thus  the  verification  of 
any international certificate can  be rapid and 
efficient.  National  structures  could  be 
complemented  by  a  co-ordination 
mechanism  at the  European  level.  Such  a 
concept is  consistent with  the  Community's 
established  negotiation  strategy  on  mutual 
recognition  and  could  encourage  the 
development  of  certification  services  in 
Europe. Agreements with third countries will 
be  both  easier to  secure  and  economically 
more  beneficial  if done  on  the  basis  of a 
common Community-wide regime. 
Mutual  recognition  provisions  in  national 
laws could  in  principle facilitate cross-border 
trust.  They  would  at the  same time  reduce 
potential  EU  Internal  Market obstacles  and 
enhance  crossborder  circulation  of  goods 
and  services.  The direct application  of the 
Treaty  (Art.  30,  52,  59,  mutual  recognition 
provisions  in  national  legislation)  could 
already  lead  to a satisfactory  functioning  of 
the  Internal  Market.  Other  possibilities  of 
ensuring  cross-border  recognition  of 
certificates  could  be  harmonised  European 
certification  services  (including  the 
procedures concerning the issuance of such 
a certificate) as  well  as  common  evaluation 
criteria and procedures. 
2.5. Privacy 
Business partners sometimes do not have an 
interest in  the  precise  identity of a particular 
person or entity,  but only  in  the  confirmation 
of previous  contacts,  in  their affiliation  to  a 
defined  group  of persons,  in  their individual 
characteristics  such  as  solvency  and 
creditability or simply in unforged data. 
Example:  Credit card  companies  do  not confirm 
the  identity of the  card-holder,  but  only whether 
this person has a certain line of credit. 
Therefore  in  many  cases  people  will  have 
several  key  pairs  corresponding  to  their 
different roles.  Those persons not wishing or 
not  obliged  by  law  to  communicate  under 
their  name  can  choose  a pseudonym which 
safeguards  their  anonymity  in  transactions 
and  communication  (though  the  signatory  is 
identified to the CA) whilst fully exploiting the 
integrity  and  authentication  functions  of 
digital  signatures.  This  possibility  is  also 
required by the EU Data Protection Directive' 
and  supported  by  the  OECD  Cryptography 
Policy  Guidelines.  Without  such  a  privacy 
safeguard,  digital  signatures  could  be 
abused  as  an  efficient instrument for tracing 
individual  on-line  consumption  patterns  and 
7  Directive 95/46/EC, 24.10.95 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 
281/31, 23.11.95.  See also Common Position 57/96, 
12.9.96 with a view to the adoption of a European 
Parliament and Council Directive concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of 
privacy in the telecommunications sector, in particular 
in the integrated services digital network (ISDN) and in 
the public digital mobile networks, OJ C315, 24.1 0.96, 
which establish the specific rules for data protection 
and the right to privacy with regard to 
telecommunications networks. 
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or misusing documents or messaaes 
There may  be cases where the  ctiscl~sure of 
pseudonyms  may  be  necessary  for  reasons 
of public security  and  crime  prevention.  The 
EU  Data  Protection  Directive  lays  down  the 
conditions  under which  Member States  may 
adopt  measures  restricting  the  right  to 
remain anonymous. 
Another  privacy  and  data  security  concern 
results  from  the  need  that key  pairs  have  to 
be  unique  and  confidential  in  order  to 
minimise  the  risks  of  "identity  theft"  and 
forgery.  CAs  must therefore  be  forbidden  to 
store  private  keys.  This  again  distinguishes 
CAs  from  TIPs  which  task  is  to  keep 
information about private keys. 
Since  CAs  must be  able  to  identify  the  key 
owner and  thus gather information about the 
individual, they are subject to the obligations 
concerning  data  processing,  security  and 
transfers to  third  countries  laid  down  by  the 
EU  Data  Protection  Directive.  For  example, 
CAs  can  only  collect  and  process  personal 
data if the individual has given his consent or 
if they are authorised by law. 
~hile  commercial  products  for  digital 
signatures  are  already  available  in  the 
market  place,  only  a  few  companies  in 
Europe  have  so  far  taken  steps  to  offer 
services  in  this  area.  One  of  the  main 
reasons  is  the  weakness  of  demand 
resulting  partly  from  the  absence  of  legal 
recognition  of  digital  signatures.  Greater 
use  of  digital  signatures  requires 
adjustments  and  changes  in  many 
regulatory  areas.  In  the  current  situation, 
the  most  important  legal  problems  result 
from  different national  rules  and  regulations 
(or  the  lack  of  them),  in  particular  the 
absence of common  requirements  for  CAs, 
of technical and operational  requirements to 
be  met  by  certain  categories  of  digital 
signature  products,  of  liability  rules  and  of 
legal  recognition  of digital  signatures.  The 
Commission  will  evaluate  the  possibility  to 
provide for the harmonisation of the different 
national  provisions  to  support  international 
mutual recognition of digital signatures. 
3. 1.EI6lborating Comnmmi~y  requiremen~s 
At  present  there  is  no  uniform  legal 
framework specifying  requirements  for  CAs 
in the European Union. This does not hinder 
Cf.,s  to  be  active  on  the  market (there  are 
alrAady  visible  commercial  activities  in  the 
US  and  also  in  the  EU).  But  serious 
obstacles for cross-border trust would  result 
from the lack of common rules. 
Example:  Certificates  issued  by  a  CA  in  one 
~ember  State would not be  recognised by a CA 
111  another  Member  State,  especially  if  one 
Member State  has  foreseen  a licensing  system 
for CAs and the certificate has been issued by a 
foreign unlicensed CA. 
Establishing  common  criteria  for  the 
activities of CAs  on  Community  level would 
allow  certificates  issued  by  a  CA  in  one 
Member State  to  be  recognised  in  all  other 
Member  States  (mutual  recognition).  Since 
these  problems  and  the  risk  that  divergent 
national rules,  or the  lack of such  rules,  will 
hold  back  the  functioning  of  the  Internal 
Market  and  the  development  of electronic 
commerce,  there  is  a  strong  case  for  a 
common  legal framework  to  be  established. 
A  Community  framework  would  enhance 
trust  in  digital  signatures,  whilst  promoting 
their  legal  recognition.  Such  a  framework 
could for instance establish principles for the 
activities of CAs. 
Example  of fields  where  common  requirements 
for CAs could be specified: 
o  security of the  CA and  compliance with  data 
protection legislation 
o  reliable  identification  of a  person  (to  make 
sure that key owners can be identified) 
o  minimum  insurance  coverage  (CAs  must be 
able to pay in case they are liable) 
o  technical components 
o  qualification and security testing of personnel 
o  no "self-certification" of the CA 
In order to achieve the highest possible level 
of security,  it would  be  appropriate to  make 
a clear distinction  between  different tasks  -
e.g.  certification  or  key  administration  - and 
between different certificates. The catalogue 
of  the  requirements  can  therefore  be 
different - depending  on  the  actual  offer of 
services. 
It  would  also  be  essential  to  establish 
common  technical  requirements  for  digital 
signature  products,  if  national  provisions 
(e.g.  for  key  generation  or  storage)  will  not 
be  mutually  recognised  and  hinder  the 
functioning  of  the  Internal  Market. 
Community  harmonisation measures should 
be  limited  to  establishing  the  essenti~l 
requirements  and  leaving  technical  details 
6 (e.g.  through  a mandate) to standardisation 
bodies. 
3.2. liabiliey 
Clear  liability  rules  would  contribute  to  the 
acceptance  of  CA  services.  However 
divergent  levels  of  protection  at  national 
level could  potentially  act as a cross-border 
barrier to the  provision of goods or services 
or to the use by public administrations of on-
line  services  in  a  cross-border  context. 
Liability questions may  play  a particular role 
in  the  relationship  between  users  and  CAs 
or between two CAs as well  as with  respect 
to licensing authorities (licensing CAs). 
In  all  Member States,  there  are  contractual 
rules connected  to  appropriate liability  rules 
between  the  user  and  the  CA.  Liability 
depends very  much  on  the  concrete  single 
cases.  For instance,  liability  problems  can 
be  better managed  if digital  signatures  are 
used within specific closed user groups. 
Liability  largely  depends upon  the  concrete 
service  offered  by  the  CA  as  stipulated  in 
the  contract.  A  legal  catalogue  of 
requirements  could  form  the  basis  for  the 
contractual duties.  It would  also  provide  for 
both  minimum  and  maximum  liability  of the 
CAs  or  guaranties,  for  example  regarding 
the  accuracy  of  the  certificate  or  the 
correctness  of  the  key  directory. 
Certification  practice  statements,  a detailed 
description  of  how  certificate  policies  are 
implemented  by  a particular CA,  could  also 
play  an  important  role  as  orientation  for 
liability issues. 
Normally there is  no  contractual relationship 
between  a  CA  and  third  parties,  like  the 
recipient  of  a  digitally  signed  message  or 
another  CA,  who  have  confidence  in  the 
validity  of  certificates.  Therefore  Member 
States  should  examine  whether  there  is  a 
need for special liability rules. 
Errors made  by  a  licensing authority in  the 
licensing  process  can  be  damaging  to  the 
user,  the  CA  and  third  parties.  Since  the 
licensing  authority  has  no  contractual 
obligations  and  since  the  extra-contractual 
liability of public authorities is usually strictly 
limited,  Member  States  should  examine 
whether  special  rules  for  liability  are 
necessary. 
3.3. Legal wecogni~oon oi digital 
signatures 
The  legal  concepts  behind  signatures  and 
the  requirements  on  form  and  procedures, 
are  different in  each  of the  Member States 
jurisdictions.  The differences,  particularly in 
the field  of civil and  procedural law,  have to 
be  analysed.  Member  States  should  be 
encouraged  to  scrutinise  the  relevant 
national  laws  and  regulations  for  provisions 
which do not allow to  exploit the  potential of 
digitally signed documents (form, evidence). 
When  signing  a  contract  using  a  digital 
signature,  one  is  confronted  with  different 
questions:  does a declaration of intent have 
a  legal  value?  Does  the  signature  meet 
legal  requirements?  Is  a  digitally  signed 
document recognised as evidence in court? 
(i) Declarations oil intent 
Legal  practices  have  emerged  in  Member 
States  over  the  years  in  connection  with 
declarations of intent.  These cannot simply 
be  translated  into  the  context  of electronic 
communication  since  the  way  to  make  a 
declaration  of  intent  differs  substantially 
from the traditional form in some respects. 
Example:  The  delivery  of a  document  in  paper 
form  requires  more  time  than  in  the  electronic 
form.  One  has  to  put  the  document  into  an 
envelope,  apply  a postage stamp  and post it.  In 
so  doing,  one  still  has time  to  reconsider one's 
decision.  An  electronic document on the  other 
hand  is  delivered  by  simply  pressing  a  key  or 
button. 
In  particular  in  order  to  guarantee  an 
appropriate  protection  against  hasty 
decisions,  Member  States  should  examine 
whether  specific  requirements  are  needed 
regarding  the  binding  character  of 
declarations of intent. 
In  addition,  technical  solutions  must  be 
found  to  make  sure  that  users  sign  a 
document  in  the  version  which  is  actually 
visible on their screen. 
Example:  Technically,  substantial  differences 
may  exist between  the  document visible on  the 
screen  and  the  document  which  is  actually 
signed  or  printed,  e.g.  if the  programme  works 
with associated files. 
(ii) Non-repudiation of digital signatures 
Even when a key  pair has been  assigned in 
total  trust to  a certain  person,  this does  not 
prove that this  person  has  actually signed a 
7 given document.  VVhile the normal situation 
is  that the  key owner signs the document, a 
digital  signature  can  in  fact  only  be 
associated  with  certainty  to  a given  private 
key.  This  presumption  will  only  hold  if it  is 
certain  that  only  the  owner  of  the  secret 
private key  has full  and  unique control  ovei 
his private key.  Key  escrow of private keys 
would endanger this presumption. 
Exampfe:  Unlike conventional  signatures,  where 
the  signatory  signs  with  his  own  hand,  digital 
signatures  also  allow  a  third  - authorised  or 
unauthorised  - person  to  sign  the  document  if 
this  person  is  in  possession  of the  private  key, 
so-called "undisclosed" delegation. 
Assignment is  however possible if it can  be 
legally presumed  that the  key  owner signed 
himself. In that case the owner might wish to 
be legally liable only to a certain extent (e.g. 
within a limit, as with a credit-card}. Member 
States should therefore consider appropriate 
legal rules. 
(iii) lagaJi tre21tment of references 
In order to carry business transactions faster 
or  for  cost  reasons,  one  can  refer  to 
documents  which  are  not  part  of  the 
electronically  transmitted  data  itself,  but 
which  are  stored  in  another  place,  e.g. 
reference  to  standard-form  contract 
conditions, technical descriptions or plans. 
Problems could however result from the fact 
that  the  technical  possibility  of referring  to 
other  documents  does  not  meet  the  legal 
requirements  that  have  emerged  from 
traditional legal relations. 
Example:  In  a  sales  contract,  a  computer 
company refers to the terms of delivery indicated 
on  the  company's  lnternet-homepage.  Under 
which  conditions  do  the  terms  of  delivery 
become part of the contract?  Do they have to be 
digitally signed as well? 
Special  rules  in  Member  States'  civil  laws 
will  therefore  be  necessary  for  the  legal 
treatment  of  references  in  electronic  legal 
relations.  The  most  important  point  is  that 
references  do  not  have  other  legal  effects 
than  those  they  would  have  if  they  were 
contained in the document in question. 
(iv) legal efiects 
Ensuring  equivalent  legal 
conventional  hand-written 
effects  for 
and  digital 
signatures is not easy to  realise considering 
their  different  characteristics  and  their 
different ways of being materialised. 
Examples: 
Unlike  conventional  signatures,  it  is  not 
possible  in  the  case  of  digitally  signed 
documents  to  distinguish  between  an 
original and a copy. 
"'  Each  person  only  has  one  hand-written 
signature.  However,  a  given  person  can 
have  several  key  sets.  Digital  signatures 
are  also  different  for  each  document 
signed. 
However,  these  differences  do  not  by  any 
means  prevent  digital  signatures  from 
enjoying  equivalent  legal  value  for  certain 
legal or judicial purposes.  The  legal effects 
of documents signed  with  digital  signatures 
is  implicitly  linked  with  trustworthiness  of 
CAs  and  is  an  indispensable  condition  for 
the  development  of  legal  electronic 
transactions.  The starting points are: 
o  Recognition as evidence in legal 
proceedings 
In  some  legal  systems  (e.g.  Belgium, 
France, Greece} electronic documents, even 
if  they  digitally  signed,  could  not  be 
accepted  as  evidence  in  legal  proceedings, 
because  written  evidence  is  required  as 
soon  as  the value of,  for instance,  a selling 
contract  is  beyond  a  certain  limit.  Such 
:estrictions are clearly detrimental to the use 
of digital signatures. 
"'  Recognition as arrequivalent to written 
form 
The  use  of a written  form  can  fulfil  several 
functions,  e.g. warning,  proof or authenticity. 
Documents provided with  a digital signature 
can  likewise  fulfil  these  functions  provided 
that digital  signatures are  safe and  reliable. 
If  documents  provided  with  a  digital 
signature  match  the  requirements  of  a 
written form,  this will  have a very favourable 
impact on  their implementation  in  the  legal 
framework. 
Member  States  could  also  implement 
specific rules  on  an  electronic form  in  their 
civil  laws.  Thus  Member States  would  not 
have  to  change  all  their  regulations  on 
written  form  but would  be  able  to  introduce 
digital  signatures  only  where  they  think  it 
would make sense. 
6 Legal  domains  in  which  no  specific  legal 
form  is  prescribed,  but where,  for  example, 
the  use  of the  written  form  is  based  on 
voluntary  business  practice,  would  greatly 
benefit  in  terms  of security  - thanks  to  the 
gain  of  confidence  - from  the  legal 
recognition of digital signatures. 
(i)  While  digital  signatures  are  currently  a 
recognised  answer  to  authentication  and 
integrity questions, the market may  come up 
with  other  solutions.  Therefore  regulation 
has to create on  one side a clear framework 
to  build trust in  digital signatures,  but on  the 
other side  also has to  be  flexible  enough  to 
react to new technological developments. 
(ii)  Regulation should not restrict,  neither de 
jure nor de  facto,  the contractual freedom of 
parties.  Therefore any  regulation  should  be 
tailored  to  correspond  to  the  different 
possible uses of digital signatures (see 11.1.). 
Private  use  of  digital  signatures  or  use 
within  closed-user  groups,  for  instance, 
might  escape  specific  regulation  entirely. 
Well-identified  cases  could  become  subject 
to  regulation,  for  example  in  official 
communication.  In  any  case,  it  must  be 
ensured that both regulated and unregulated 
digital  signature  schemes  can  co-exist  and 
are interoperable. 
(iii) Some Member States are in  the process 
of  introducing  voluntary  schemes,  and 
others  consider  mandatory  licensing 
schemes,  to  build  trust  in  CAs  and  to 
encourage  legal  recognition  of  digital 
signatures.  However,  licensing  is  only  one 
of  the  possible  trust-enhancing  methods 
Member  States  may  apply  to  promote  the 
use  of legally  valid  digital  signatures.  Non-
licensed,  but  highly  regarded  private  or 
public  organisations  may  as  well  be 
considered as a trusted CA. 
(iv)  In the context of licensing,  it is important 
to  distinguish  clearly  between  on  the  one 
hand,  the  procedures  and  conditions 
governing  the  establishment of a  CA,  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  conditions  imposed 
on  the  different services  provided  by  a CA. 
The Treaty Articles 52  and  59 apply to each 
of  these  situations.  Different  national 
regulatory  approaches  and  the  lack  of 
mutual recognition of each other's regulatory 
requirements  may  easily  lead,  due  to  the 
inherent  cross-border  nature  of  digital 
signatures, to a fragmentation of the Internal 
Market for electronic commerce and  on-line 
services throughout the Union. 
(v)  Restrictive  practices  with  regard  to  the 
establishment  of  CAs,  the  services  they 
provide,  the  cryptographic  tools  they  use, 
etc. will be detrimental to the free circulation 
of  goods  and  services  within  the  Internal 
Market.  They  should  not  undermine  the 
freedom  of  establishment,  for  example  by 
discriminating  without  justification  on  the 
basis  of nationality  or by  restricting  without 
justification  the  number  of  those  providing 
CA  services.  The  scope  and  the  timeframe 
of Community  action  would  be  determined 
by  the  need  for  harmonisation.  Since 
mandatory  licensing  of CAs  is  not the  only 
way  to  ensure compliance of CA's activities 
with public intentions of how to promote trust 
in  digital  signatures,  an  EU  regulatory 
framework would have to provide for the co-
existence  of  both  licensed  and  unlicensed 
CAs.  Such  a  framework  should  be  put  in 
place at the latest by the year 2000. 
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1.  The economic a~r~dl socieUill 
impoU'lcanca o1 encry!P'tnoll'iJ. 
(i)  An  encryption  algorithm  transforms  a 
plaintext  into  an  unreadable  ciphered  text 
(encryption)  and  vice  versa  (decryption) 
using a special key.  The economics behind 
encryption  is  to  transform  the  problem  of 
keeping thousands of messages secret into 
the  problem of keeping  a single key  secret. 
A  useful  distinction  can  be  made  between 
symmetric  and  asymmetric  encryption 
algorithms [see  Annex II  for  more  detailed 
explanation]. 
Symmetric algorithms use the same  key  for 
encryption and  decryption.  This means that 
communicating  parties  have  to  agree  on  a 
secret key  in  advance.  The disadvantage is 
that  they  have  to  find  a  secure  way  to 
exchange  this  key.  This  is  particularly 
cumbersome  in  an  open  environment  with 
many  participants  that  may  not  know  each 
other  beforehand.  This  disadvantage  is 
avoided  in  asymmetric  encryption  methods 
that  use  different  keys  for  encryption  and 
decryption. 
At  present,  encryption  provides  the  most 
important  tool  to  keep  electronic 
communication  and  electronically  stored 
9 documents  confidential.  Although  new 
technologies  will  emerge  sooner or later,  it 
can  be  expected that encryption will  remain 
the  cornerstone  for  most  confidentiality 
services  on  open  networks  for  the 
foreseeable future. 
Encryption  has  a  long  tradition  in  the 
defence  area.  However  encryption 
technologies are increasingly integrated into 
commercial systems and applications. 
Examples: 
o  Digital  mobile  telephones  enjoy,  thanks  to 
encryption, stronger protection . 
o  Banks  use  strong  encryption  for  financial 
messages (e.g. the S.W.I.F.T system). 
o  Pay-TV  can  only  function  commercially 
thanks  to  encryption  which  can  then  be 
decrypted on payment of a subscription fee. a 
o  Digital  versatile  disks  (DVD).  which  will 
replace  the  previous  video  cassettes,  use 
encryption  techniques  to  prevent  piracy  in 
order to protect intellectual property rights. 
(ii)  The  above examples  already  show that 
the  exclusive  character  of  encryption 
belongs  to  the  past.  They  also  show  that 
increasingly  encryption  technology  is 
integrated  into products primarily to  protect, 
for example,  Intellectual  Property  Rights  or 
to  avoid fraud.  Moreover,  the  fast growth of 
the  Internet  will  create  a  fundamental 
change  in  the  use  of  encryption:  it  will 
become  an  integral  part  of  personal  and 
business computing. 
Computer stores sell cryptographic products 
and  more  and  more  people  simply  down-
load  encryption  software  from  the  Internet 
which  can  be  easily  installed  on  a  normal 
PC.  The  integration  of  complete  cipher 
machines on  smart cards  is  a reality.  PCs 
could  be  delivered with  standardised  smart 
card  readers and fast crypto-chips.  Various 
universities  in  the  world  teach  cryptology 
and  hundreds of companies  in  Europe and 
even more world-wide develop, produce and 
sell  products  and  systems  to  be  used  for 
encryption. 
A survey  has  identified  not less than  1  ,400 
encryption  computer  products  world-wide
9
. 
•  The protection of such encryption systems against 
pirflcy varies in Member States. The Commission has 
presented a proposal for a Directive aiming at 
establishing a Community-wide equal level of 
protection (COM(97)356, 9.7.97) 
9 Survey conducted by Trusted Information 
Systems,http://www.tis.com/docs/research/crypto/ 
survey/ index.html 
More than  400  companies from  the  US and 
about 440 companies outside the  US,  many 
of  them  in  Europe,  now  offer  encryption 
products
10
.  Involved  in  this  process  are 
incumbents  like  computer,  software  and 
telecommunication  companies  as  well  as 
high-tech  start-ups.  Most  of  the  young 
companies  are  growing  fast:  numerous 
examples  exist  where  the  annual  growth 
rates  of turnover or  employment are  100% 
and even more. 
(iii)  Electronic  commerce  and  many  other 
applications  of  the  information  society  will 
only expand  and  unfold their economic and 
social  benefits  if  confidentiality  can  be 
assured  in  a user-friendly and  cost-efficient 
way. 
Examples: 
o  When  using  services  such  as  tele-shopping 
or  tele-banking,  the  consumer  needs  to  be 
ensured  that  personal  data  such  as  credit 
card numbers are kept confidential. 
o  Data  protection  laws  require  safeguards  like 
encryption to ensure privacy. 
In  storing  secret  data  and  in  carrying  out 
sensitive  business  communication  (project 
details,  bidding  information,  research  results, 
etc.)  over open networks,  companies wish  to 
be protected against industrial espionage. 
o  Health  care  telematic  applications  must  not 
allow  for  disclosure  of  medical  histories  of 
patients to unauthorised persons. 
Cryptographic  technologies  are  flexible, 
support  a  wide  range  of  applications  and 
minimise  transaction  costs  on  open 
networks.  Continuous  progress  in  digital 
technologies  will  make  computing  crypto-
algorithms  even  more  cost-efficient. 
European  companies  have  developed 
substantial  capabilities  to  integrate  high-
quality  cryptographic  features  into  their 
products  and  services.  As  demand  for 
products  with  encryption  is  now  growing 
very  fast world-wide,  it  provides substantial 
opportunities  for  the  industry  and  job 
creation in Europe. 
Furthermore,  the  application  of 
cryptographic  products  and  services  will 
have  an  enabling  effect  in  all  sectors  of 
economic  and  social  activity.  Without this 
10  see also Computer Systems Policy Project CSPP: 
"Perspectives on security in the infonnation age", 
January 1996. CSPP is an affiliation of chief executive 
officers of leading American computer companies -
http://www.podesta.com/cspp. 
10 widescale  deployment,  the  ability  to  create 
new,  more  competitive  forms  of  business 
and  new  forms  of social  interaction  will  be 
substantially inhibited. 
(iv)  International tieaties,  constitutions  and 
laws  guarantee  the  fundamental  right  to 
privacy  including  secrecy  of 
communications 
11
.  Consequently,  in  the 
current  shift  from  off-line  to  on-line 
information  flows,  the  public  needs to  have 
access  to  technical  tools  allowing  effective 
protection  of the  confidentiality  of data  and 
communication  against  arbitrary  intrusions. 
Encryption  of  data  is  very  often  the  only 
effective  and  cost-efficient  way  of  meeting 
these requirements.  Therefore,  the  debate 
about the  prohibition or limitation of the  use 
of  encryption  directly  affects  the  right  to 
privacy,  its  effective  exercise  and  the 
harmonisation of data protection laws  in  the 
Internal Market. 
2.  Reg1Uli2I~fiol11l of  teil11Ci)f!l>tioi"il:  !Pio~smlii:a~~ 
im~ac~  10ll11l  ~lhe llll'ltemallllfiarkst 
2.1. Export control measures 
Concerns  over  foreign  threats  to  national 
security  have  been  the  primary  motive  for 
export  controls.  Whilst  countries  want  to 
protect  their  own  military  and  diplomatic 
communication  through  encryption,  the 
objective  of  export  control  is  precisely  to 
deny  similar  benefits  of  cryptography  to 
foreign opponents, in particular if they do not 
have  equivalent  technical  means. 
Therefore,  export  controls  are  in  general 
designed  to  prevent  international 
proliferation  of  certain  encryption 
technologies. 
Under  the  Wassenaar  arrangement  on 
export  controls  for  conventional  arms  and 
dual-use  goods  and  technologies 
(19.12.1995)12,  replacing  the  COCOM
13  list, 
a group of 28 countries apply export controls 
to encryption products. 
11  Art. 12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 
17 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Art.  8 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. F(2) 
Treaty on EU, EU Data Protection Directive 
12  see http://www2.nttca.com:8010/infomofa/press/ 
c_s/wassenaar. html; http://ideath.parrhesia.com/ 
wassenaar/wassenaar.html 
13 Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls was an international organisation for the 
control of the export of strategic products and 
technologies to proscribed destinations. Members were 
to a large extent NATO countries but also others like 
Japan and Australia. 
Within  the  European  Union,  the  Dual-Use 
Regulation of December 1994 establishes a 
common  framework  for  exports of dual-use 
goods 
14  Certain  encryption  products  may 
only  be  exported  on  the  basis  of  an 
authorisation.  In  order  to  establish  an 
Internal  Market  for  dual-use  goods,  such 
export  authorisations  are  valid  throughout 
the Community. 
Moreover,  according  to  Article  19  of  this 
Dual-Use  Regulation,  Member  States 
exercise  a  licence  procedure  for  a 
transitional  period  also  for  intra-Community 
trade  for  certain  particularly  sensitive 
products.  For  the  time  being  this  also 
includes  encryption  products.  This  means 
the  Regulation obliges  Member  States  to 
impose not only export controls (i.e. controls 
on  goods  leaving  Community  territory)  on 
dual-use  goods,  but  also  intra-Community 
controls  on  cryptography  products  shipped 
from one Member State to another. 
The Dual  Use  Regulation  however does not 
fully  specify  the  scope,  content  and 
implementation  practices  of  national 
controls.  Consequently,  a  large  variety  of 
domestic  licensing  schemes  and  practices 
exists.  These  divergences  can  lead  to 
distortion of competition. 
2.2. Domestic control measures 
Law  enforcement  authorities  and  national 
security  agencies  are  concerned  that wide-
spread  use of encrypted communication will 
diminish their capacity to fight against  crime 
or  prevent  criminal  and  terrorist  activities. 
For  this  reason,  in  several  Member  States 
consideration  is  being  given  to  how  their 
encryption policy could develop in the future. 
This  has  led  to  national  and  international 
discussions  about  the  need,  technical 
possibilities,  effectiveness,  proportionality 
and  privacy  implications  of  such  a 
regulation. 
(i) E:Kisting regulation within the 
European Union and the OECD 
Whilst  export  control  measures  are 
internationally  widely  applied,  up  to  now, 
domestic  control  of  encryption  is  quite 
14  Council Regulation (EC) 3381/94, 19.12.94 setting 
up a Community regime for the control of exports of 
dual-use goods, OJ L 367/1, 31.12.94. Council 
Decision 94/942/CFSP, 19 12.94 establishes the lists of 
dual-use goods covered by the Regulation, OJ l367/8, 
31.12.94. 
11 exceptional.  In  fact,  currently  only  one 
Member  State  of  the  European  Union 
(France),  applies  a  comprehensive 
cryptographic  regulation 
15  Although  there 
have  been  discussions  in  other  Member 
States,  only the  United  Kingdom  has  so  far 
launched  a  Public  Consultation  on  the 
regulation  of  TTPs  for  the  provision  of 
encryption  services  (but  not  for  use  of 
encryption)  1s. 
The  international  picture  is  quite  similar. 
Looking  at  the  OECD  countries,  besides 
export  controls  there  are  basically  no 
domestic  regulations  implemented.  In  the 
US  - where  up  to  now  no  domestic 
regulation  is  in  place  - there is  an  intensive 
debate  on  several  legislative  initiatives.  In 
taking up the developing debate on this topic 
in some OECD Member countries and  trying 
to avoid  obstacles to international trade and 
commerce  resulting  from  divergent national 
policies,  the  OECD has adopted Guidelines 
for a cryptography policy. 
(ii) Regulation of use of encryp~ion 
Regulation  of use  would  mean  to  rule  the 
use of encryption without an authorisation as 
illegal.  Alternatively  or additionally,  supply 
and  import  of  encryption  products  and 
services  could  be  brought  under  an 
authorisation scheme.  Authorisations would 
either  be  denied  or  granted  under  certain 
conditions,  for  instance  to  use  only  weak 
encryption or to sell only approved software. 
These  conditions  are  scaleable  to  satisfy 
any  perceived  needs  of  law  enforcement 
and national security agencies. 
Such  regulations  could  limit  the  use  of 
encryption.  In  addition,  divergence  between 
regulatory schemes might result in obstacles 
to  the  functioning  of the  Internal  Market,  in 
particular for the free circulation. 
15  LoiN" 90-1170 of29.12.90, JORF 30.12. 90; Deere! 
N"  92-1358,28.12.92, JORF 30.12.92 ;.  Delivery, 
exportation and use of cryptography are subjected to 
previous declaration if the cryptography can have no 
other object than authenticating communications or 
assuring the integrity of transmitted messages, and 
previous authorisation by the Prime Minister in all other 
cases.  This law is currently being modified according 
to loi N" 96-659, 26.7.96 de reglementation des 
telecommunications art 17; http:/lwww.telecom.gouv.fr/ 
francais/activ/telecom /nloi17 .htm 
16 Licensing of TIPs for the provision of encryption 
services - DTI  Public Consultation Paper on detailed 
proposals for legislation, 3.1997; 
http://www.dti.gov.uklpubs/ 
Example: 
If  an  encryption  software  company  which  can 
freely  develop  its  products  in  its  home  country, 
must  comply  with  specific  technical  or  legal 
requirements  in  other  Member  States,  this 
company  has  to  produce  at  least  two,  if  not 
more,  different  versions  of  its  encryption 
software.  The  same  situation  occurs  if 
enterprises want to offer cross-border encryption 
services. 
Today, nobody can be totally prevented from 
encrypting  data  (criminals  or terrorists  also 
can  use  encryption  for  their  activities 
17
): 
Firstly,  access  to  encryption  software  is 
relatively  easy,  for  instance  by  simply 
downloading  it from  the  Internet.  Secondly, 
it  is  difficult to  prove  that  a specific person 
has  sent  an  unauthorised  encrypted 
message.  Electronic  communication  on 
open  networks  is  not  like  an  end-to-end 
telephone  conversation  where  people  can 
be  identified  for  instance  by  their  voice. 
Thirdly,  encryption  is  also  possible  using 
steganographic  methods18.  These  methods 
allow one  to  hide  a message  in  other data 
(e.g.  images)  in  such  a way  that  even  the 
existence of a secret message and  thus the 
use of encryption cannot be detected. 
As  a result,  restricting the  use of encryption 
could  well  prevent  law-abiding  companies 
and  citizens  from  protecting  themselves 
against  criminal  attacks.  It  would  not 
however prevent totally  criminals from using 
these technologies. 
2.3. Lawful access to encryption keys 
The underlying principle  of this  approach  is 
to  require  that  products  and  services 
incorporating encryption allow access to  the 
respective  keys.  This  would  permit 
government agencies  to  decrypt a ciphered 
text  otherwise  difficult  or  impossible  to 
crack.  Different  technical  and  institutional 
ways  to  provide  key  access  are  being 
discussed.  The  two  most  known  concepts 
are  key escrow and  key recovery.  Broadly 
speaking,  these  concepts  imply  that copies 
(escrow  concept)  or  information  (recovery 
·----------·----
17 Most of !he (few) criminal cases involving encryption 
that are quoted as examples for the need of regulation 
concern "professional" use of encryption. It seems 
unlikely that in such cases the use of encryption could 
be effectively controlled by regulation; see also 
"Encryption and Evolving technologies as tools of 
organised crime and terrorism" by D.E. Denning and 
W.E. Baugh, Jr. http://guru.cosc.georgetown. 
edu/-denning/crypto/oc-abs.html 
18 see Annex II 
12 concept)  about  relevant  keys  are  given 
either directly to  government agencies or to 
TTPs [see t:t.rmeu  :~!]. 
(i)  :<2y  access  1:chemes  are  considered  0y 
law  snforcement  arJencies  as  a  possible 
solution  to  cop·z  with  i;.;sues  like  encrypted 
messages.  Ho~~·ever  these  schemes  and 
associated TIPs raise  a  number  of critical 
questions  that  would  need  to  be  carefully 
addressed  before  introducing  them.  The 
ongoing  discussion  of  different  legislative 
initiatives in the US  is an  illustrative example 
of the  implied  controversy. The most critical 
points  are  vulnerability,  privacy,  costs  and 
effectiveness: 
o  Inevitably,  any  key  access  scheme 
introduces additional ways to break into a 
cryptographic system
1
B  More people will 
know  about  "secret  keys"  and  "system 
designs" leading to higher risks of insider 
abuse  and  the  TTPs  itself can  become 
target  for  attacks.  These  new 
vulnerabilities  are  complex  and  need  to 
be  understood as substantial liability and 
privacy questions are implied. 
o  The  costs  associated  with  key  access 
schemes can  be  very  high.  Up to  now, 
questions on  costs  and  who  would  bear 
them have not been  addressed by  policy 
makers.  Important cost factors would  be 
the  specific  requirements  put  on  TIPs, 
e.g.  response  time  to  deliver  l<eys, 
storage  time  for  session  keys, 
authenticate  requesting  government 
agency,  secure  transfer  of  recovered 
keys, internal security safeguards, etc. 
Furthermore,  substantial  and  unknown 
costs  would  occur through  the  need  for 
scaleability  of key  access  schemes,  i.e. 
making  it  work  in  a  multi-million  user 
environment.  Up  to  now,  such  systems 
have  at  best  been  developed  for  small 
scale use.  The costs to make them work 
on an economy of even global wide scale 
need to be looked at carefully. 
o  Key  access  schemes  can  be  easily 
circumvented  - even  if,  hypothetically 
speaking,  everyone  would  be  forced  to 
pass through these systems. 
19  See for a comprehensive analysis the recently 
published study  "The risks of key recovery, key 
escrow, and trusted third party encryption", 
http://www.crypto.com/key-study. 
r-~~-'"  ·---~---~--~~·~·-~~-~~~-~~l 
Users  could  first  encrypt  the  data  wi(h  an  ' 
unrecoverable  key  and  later  use  a  licensee; 
escro•·'Jed  encryption  system.  Unless 
encr~ption as  such  is  forbiddan,  ihis  ~·•ouid 
even  be  legal.  .L\nyhcw,  such  an  ope•ation 
could  only  be  detected  when  an  agency 
actually  tries  to  decrypt  the  data.  !t  is 
impossible to "scan" the network to detect the 
use  of non-escrowed  enc1Jiption.  Therefore 
use_ of non-escrowed  encryption  would  not 
even be  able to  act as a general indicator for 
possible illegal activities. 
o  Users could encrypt a relatively large number 
of  session  keys  in  a way  that the  previous 
key  enciJipts the next one,  always using  one 
or  several  official  escrow/recoveiJI  systems. 
Only  the  last key  would  be  used  to  enciJipt 
the  message.  An  agency  would  need  to 
reverse this process and to obtain all keys in 
order  to  read  the  message;  although 
technically  feasible,  this  task  would  be 
extremely difficult to manage.  To  be  noted, 
the users would have fully complied to  a key 
recoveiJI scheme. 
(ii)  Any  involvement  of  a  third  party  in 
confidential  communication  increases  its 
vulnerability.  The  main  reason  for involving 
a third  party  in  the  management of keys  for 
confidentiality  is  to  allow that party  to  make 
the  keys  available  to  other  than  the  two 
communicating  parties,  for example,  to  law 
enforcement. 
Users  may  therefore  not  see  many 
advantages  in  using  TTPs  for  confidential 
communication,  and  probably  not  even  for 
stored  information.  Regulators  would  thus 
need to offer incentives to convince users to 
use  licensed  TTPs  for  confidentiality 
purposes,  for  instance  through  a  "public 
security  label"  or  even  by  introducing  a 
"mandatory  scheme".  Such  a  mandatory 
scheme  would  make  any  publicly  available 
offer  of  encryption  services  subject  to  a 
licence  that  inter  alia  would  demand  key 
escrow/recovery. 
The  acceptance  of such  a system  remains 
to  be  seen,  but given  its implied overheads, 
can  not  be  regarded  as  an  incentive  for 
electronic  commerce.  In  any  case, 
restrictions  imposed  by  national  licensing 
schemes,  particularly  those  of a mandatory 
nature,  could  lead  to  Internal  Market 
obstacles and reduce the competitiveness of 
the European Industry. 
13 :='1ivacy  consicieralions  suggest  not  to  limit 
the  use  of  cryptography  as  a  means  to 
ensure data secuiity ancl  confidentiality.  The 
fundamen"lc:.i  right  oi  privacy  has  to  be 
ensured,  but  may  be  restricted  for  other 
legitimate  reasons  such  as  safeguarding 
national  security  or  combating  crime,  if 
these restrictions  are  appropriate,  effective, 
necessary  and  proportionate  in  order  to 
achieve these other objectives. The EU  Data 
Protection  Directive  harmonises  the 
conditions  under which  access  to  personal 
data,  their processing  and  transfer to  third 
countries is lawful. 
As  regards  data  security  the  Directive 
requires  Member  States  to  provide  that  a 
data  controller  must  implement  appropriate 
technical  and  organisational  measures  to 
protect  personal  data  against  accidental  or 
unlawful  destruction  or  accidental  loss, 
alteration,  unauthorised  disclosure  or 
access,  in  particular where  the  processing 
involves  the  transmission  of  data  over  a 
network, and against all other unlawful forms 
of processing. 
Cryptography  is  one  important  technical 
means  by  which  data  integrity  and  their 
confidentiality  can  be  ensured.  To  ensure 
also  the  secure  flow  of  personal  data 
throughout  the  Internal  Market,  such 
technical means must be able to "travel" with 
the  personal  information  they  are  securing. 
Any  regulation  hindering  the  use  of 
encryption products and services throughout 
the  Internal  Market thus  hinders the  secure 
and free flow of personal information and the 
provision of related goods and services. 
3. Assessmenn'c 
Proposals for regulation  of encryption  have 
generated  considerable  controversy. 
Industry  expresses  major  concerns  about 
encryption  regulation,  including  key  escrow 
and  key  recovery  schemes
20  Although 
there  is  a lack  of experience,  as  electronic 
communication  and  commerce  have  just 
begun  to  penetrate economy  and  society,  a 
preliminary  assessment  can  be  made  in 
order  to  build  a  common  European 
understanding of the subject,  in  particular as 
20 see e.g. Industrial Declaration of the Bonn 
conference, July 97, http://www2.echo.lu/bonn 
/industry.html 
Member Siates may  hc:ve  dif:eia11t vie1.15  on 
security  issve2  j,·npiied.  Sucn  <:>n 
understa.nc:i,lg  could  :Je  founded  o!"t  t:1e 
following points: 
(i)  Problems caL•sed  by  sncr)ptio,, to  crime 
investigation and  tile finding  o~ evide:1ce  are 
currently  limited,  but  they  may  increase  in 
the  future.  As  with  any  new  technology, 
there  will  be  abuse  of  encryption  and 
criminal  investigations  will  be  hindered 
because  data  was  encrypted.  However, 
widespread  availability  of  encryption  can 
also  prevent  crime.  Already  today,  the 
damage  caused  by  electronic  crime  is 
estimated  in  the  order  of  billions  of ECUs 
(industrial  espionage,  credit  card  fraud,  toll 
fraud  on  cellular telephones,  piracy  on  pay 
TV  encryption).  Therefore,  there  are 
considerable  economic  and  legal  benefits 
associated with encryption. 
(ii)  Criminals  cannot  be  entirely  prevented 
from having access to strong encryption and 
from  bypassing  escrowed  encryption. 
Benefits  of regulation  for  crime  fighting  are 
therefore  not  easy  to  assess  and  often 
expressed  in  a  fairly  general  language. 
However control  measures could  make use 
of  encryption  for  criminal  activities  more 
difficult and cumbersome. 
(iii)  In  the  information  society,  citizens  and 
companies  will  increasingly  carry  out  more 
aspects  of their  lives  and  business  on-line. 
Through  teleconferencing,  tele-shopping, 
teleworking,  electronic payment,  e-mail,  etc. 
a  huge  amount  of  information  will  be 
available  electronically,  in  a  way  never 
experienced  before.  Therefore,  if citizens 
and  companies  have  to  fear  that  their 
communication  and  transactions  are 
monitored  with  the  help  of  key  access  or 
similar  schemes  unduly  enlarging  the 
general  surveillance  possibility  of 
government  agencies,  they  may  prefer 
remaining  in  the  anonymous  off-line  world 
and  electronic  commerce  will  just  not 
happen
21
. 
(iv)  Key  escrow  or  key  recovery  raise  a 
number of practical  and  complex questions 
that  policy  makers  would  need  to  solve,  in 
particular  issues  of  privacy,  vulnerability, 
effectiveness  and  costs.  If at  all  required, 
regulation  should  be  limited  to  what  is 
absolutely necessary. Regulation would also 
"see Eurobarometer opinion survey 46.1  on privacy in 
the information society, January 1997 
14 need  to  distinguish  between  a  multitude  of 
possible  key  types  (storage  keys,  session 
keys,  authentication keys,  etc.) as there are 
important differences in their functionality. 
(v)  in  the  context  of  electronic  commerce 
using  open  ·and  global  networks,  the 
international availability,  iniemperability and 
choice  of various  encryption  products  and 
services  is  necessary.  Any  regulation 
hindering the use of encryption products and 
services  throughout  the  Internal  Market 
hinders the secure and free flow of personal 
information  and  the  provision  of  related 
goods  and  services,  and  its  justification 
needs to  be  examined  in  light of the Treaty 
and the EU  Data Protection Directive 
(vi)  The  ultimate  objective  for  government 
agencies  is  to  see  plaintext  and  not 
necessarily  to  have  access  to  keys. 
Furthermore  traffic  analysis  (e.g.  who 
communicates  with  whom?)  is  also 
important and  would  benefit from increased 
electronic  communications.  Information, 
even  encrypted  for  communication,  can 
often  be  found  unencrypted  at  the  source, 
just  as  with  traditional  forms  of 
communication,  for  instance  with  banks, 
shops,  travel  agencies  involved  in 
communication  with  a  suspect,  or  can  be 
tapped  unencrypted  at  certain  points  in  a 
communication  link.  Therefore  existing 
regulation  on  traditional  forms  of  lawful 
access to data and communication could be 
explored with a view to effectively applying it 
to  access  to  encrypted  data  and 
communication, e.g.  regulation could require 
access  provision  to  encrypted  information 
upon legally authorised request. 
(vii)  A  fundamental  problem  lies  in 
international  relations,  i.e.  how  to  ensure 
global  communication  in  case  key 
escrow/recovery  regulation  is  introduced  in 
some countries.  Countries  would  probably 
insist  that  only  national  TIPs  could  hold 
keys of their citizens.  For instance,  in  case 
of a  session  key  recovery  scheme  that  is 
linked to  an  e-mail communication,  only the 
country  of  the  sender  could  decrypt  the 
message  unless  there  is  a  special 
arrangement between the two countries. 
(viii)  Irrespective  of  the  compatibility  of 
restrictions with the Treaty provisions on  the 
free  circulation  of  goods  and  services, 
specific  national  controls  on  the  use  of 
encryption  could  also  have  a  secondary 
effect  on  the  free  circulation  of  persons, 
similar to those already identified by the Veil 
Panel 22 
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Electronic communication via open networks 
is  at  the  core  of  the  information  society. 
Fast  and  secure  exchange  of  data  offers 
many  advantages  for  electronic  commerce 
which  can  contribute  decisively  to 
improvements  in  competitiveness  and  job 
creation.  The European Union has an  early 
opportunity  to  create  the  conditions  for  a 
trend-setting infrastructure and  for growth in 
European industry. 
The  Commission  will  seek  to  build  trust in 
electronic communication via open networks 
to  ensure  the  functioning  of  the  Internal 
Market,  to  stimulate  electronic  commerce 
and to strengthen the European Industry. 
1. Community ~ramework  ~or  dligiqSl~ 
sigi'lla~tiU!Ii'es 
1.1. The need for European Union a~ctnon 
Detailed  regulations  for  digital  signatures 
are  already  under  preparation  in  some 
Member  States.  France  has  already 
adopted  a  new  Telecommunications  Act, 
Germany a law on  digital  signatures
23
,  Italy . 
a  law  011  the  use  of electronic  documents 
and  con~racts
24 .  The  UK  Government has 
launched  a  Public  Consultation  on  the 
regulatio'1 of TIPs.  The Dutch Government 
has  created  an  inter-departmental  task 
force
2s.  Denmark  and  Belgium26  are  also 
preparing  draft  legislation  on  digital 
signatures.  The  Swedish  government 
organised a public hearing in June 1997. 
Whilst the development of a clear framework 
is  welcomed,  the  very  divergent  legal  and 
technical  approaches  which  have  already 
appeared  and  the  absence  of  any  legal 
environment in  other Member States - also 
possibly justified - might constitute a serious 
22  Report of the High Level Panel on the free 
movement of persons, chaired by Mrs. Simone Veil, 
presented to the Commission, 18.3.97 
"Gesetz zur digitalen Signatur (SigG), 1.8.97; 
http:/lwww.iid.de/rahmen/iukdgbt.htrnl#a3 
24  Schema di Regolamento "Atti, documenti e contratti 
in forma elettronica", approved by the Italian Council of 
ministers, 5.8.97 
25 Staatscourant nr.  54,  18.3.97 
26 see http:/lwww.agoraproject.org/ 
15 barrier  to  c:oing  business  and 
cornmunicc:thlt  throughout  the  European 
u.1ion.  This  vvill  undermine  the  free 
circulation  or  digital  signature  related 
proc:ucts  and  services  within  the  lntemal 
[lljarl\et  as  well  as  the  development of new 
economic  activities  linked  to  electronic 
commerce.  In  order to  stimulate  electronic 
commerce  and  the  competitiveness  of  the 
European  industry  as  well  as  to  abolish  the 
free circulation obstacles and to facilitate the 
use  of  digital  signatures  across  national 
borders,  a  common  framework  at 
Community  level  is  urgently  needed  and 
should  be  put  in  place  at the  latest by  the 
year 2000. 
1.2. Scope of a1  Community framewori< 
The  goal  of any  Community  initiative  must 
be  to  encourage  Member  States  to  rapidly 
implement  appropriate  measures  to  build 
trust in  digital  signatures.  The Commission 
therefore  considers  proposing  - in  the 
context of the Amsterdam Treaty - first pillar 
legislation  on  the  basis  of  this 
Communication.  The following  steps would 
be  necessary  from  the  Commission's  point 
of view: 
(i) Common legilll requirements for CAs 
Common  European  certification 
requirements  are  crucial.  By  establishing 
defined common  criteria  for the  activities  of 
CAs,  the  Community  could  put  in  place  a 
framework  allowing  that  certificates  issued 
by  a  CA  in  one  Member  State  are 
recognised  in  all  other  Member  States.  A 
Community  framework  would  have  to  refer 
particularly  to  the  setting  of  common 
requirements  for  the  establishment  and 
operation  of  CAs  allowing  for  the  co-
existence of licensed and  non-licensed CAs. 
Common classes of certificates may also be 
needed  so  that the  levels  of assurance and 
trust  for  certificates  are  the  same  in  all 
Member  States.  Detailed  implementation 
and  the  means  of  applying  such  rules 
(licensing regime, self-certification) would be 
a matter for Member States to decide. 
To  support  international  mutual  recognition 
of  digital  signatures  the  Commission  will 
furthermore  identify  the  need  for  common 
technical  and  operational  requirements  as 
well  as  common  evaluation  criteria  and 
procedures, including standards, concerning 
digital signature products. 
In  order  to  acl1ielie  as  lr'ide  c-s  pos£i:)le 
acceptance  of  digital  signatures,  nation21 
legal  systems  may  need  to  be  adapted  to 
ensure that they  offer the  sarne  recognition 
and  treatment  to  digital  signai:ures  as  to 
conventional signatures. 
The  Commission  will  complete  its  currently 
ongoing  assessment of the  need  to  provide 
for the  legal recognition of digital signatures 
at  Community  level.  The  different  national 
provisions  inhibiting  the  full  exploitation  of 
digitally  signed  electronic  documents  (form 
requirements,  evidence  rules),  on  the  basis 
of which  further proposals  for action will  be 
made will  also be  taken  into account.  Legal 
form  requirements  and  the  validity  of 
signatures as evidence in  legal proceedings 
should  rapidly  be  submitted  to examination 
by justice ministers. 
(iii) International co-operation 
Electronic  communication  is  not  limited  to 
the  European  Union.  Therefore  - where 
appropriate  a  framework  must  be 
developed  at  an  international  level  once  a 
Community  position  has  been  established. 
This  requires  participation  of Europe  (both 
on  Community and on  Member States level) 
in international initiatives and fora. 
Many  of such  international  initiatives  have 
been  initiated  at  different  levels.  Bilateral 
(EUIUS,  EU/Japan)  and  multilateral  (e.g. 
UNCITRAL
27
)  discussions  have  started. 
UNCITRAL  has  completed  the  work  on  a 
Model  Law  on  Electronic  Commerce28  and 
has  recently  initiated  subsequent  work 
aiming at the preparation of uniform rules on 
digital  signatures  and  the  related  (cross-
border)  services  (CAs).  Work  in  the  OECD 
based  on  the  Guidelines  for  cryptography 
policy  is  continuing.  Other  international 
organisations,  such  as  the  INTO,  may 
become  involved  with  regard  to  avoiding 
trade obstacles and  other aspects related to 
their  specific  area  of  competence  and 
expertise. 
In the United States
9  almost all States have 
either  started  working  on  or  have  already 
legislation  on  digital  signatures.  Agencies, 
such as the Food  and  Drugs Administration, 
27  United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law 
28 http://www.un.or.aUuncitrallindex.html 
29 An update on the status of US legislation can be 
found on http://www.mbc.com/ds_sum.html 
16 are promulgating regulations specific to their 
area of responsibility30  At the  federal  level, 
Congress  is  considering  several  legislative 
initiatives.  In  Japan,  some  technical  and 
regulatory  activities  in  the  area  of 
authentication  and  electronic  transactions 
have been launched earlier this year. 
At  the  business  level  the  American  Bar 
Association  produced  the  "Digital  Signature 
Guidelines"
31  and  the  Internet  Law  and 
Policy Forum (ILPF) is working on the role of 
CAs in consumer transactions
32
. 
In  view  of these  world-wide  activities  the 
Commission  recommends  that  the 
Community  continues  and  initiates  the 
dialogues  on  international  level.  The  goal 
must  be  to  remove  existing  obstacles  in 
order to  create an  internationally compatible 
framework  for  electronic  commerce,  in 
particular  to  establish  common  technical 
standards  and  mutual  recognition  of 
certificates. 
2.  Po~ncy  Oli'D®Il1l~aJ~ocU1ls DUll  11:hs alli'Sal q1 
SBlCJrYJiltfiOU1l 
(i)  The  EC  Treaty  and  the  Treaty  on  the 
European  Union  fully  respect  the 
competence  of Member  States  with  regard 
to  the  areas  of  national  security  and  law 
enforcement.  If national  restrictions  are  put 
into  place  they  have  to  be  compatible  with 
Community  law.  Therefore  the  Commission 
will  examine  whether  national  restrictions 
are  totally  or partially justified,  notably  with 
respect  to  the  free  circulation  provisions  of 
the  Treaty,  the  case  law  of  the  Court  of 
Justice  and  the  requirements  imposed  by 
the Data Protection Directive. 
o  National  restrictions  must  respect  the 
principle  of  proportionality  (be 
appropriate, effective and  not go  beyond 
what  is  necessary  for  attaining  the 
objective pursued). 
c  Member  States  already  have  to 
communicate  to  the  Commission  and 
through  it,  to  the  other  Member  States 
their  intended  technical  rules,  the 
observance  of which  is  compulsory,  de 
jure  or  de  facto,  in  case  of  marketing, 
use,  manufacturing  or  importation  of  a 
product,  cryptographic  products 
30 http://www.fda.gov/cder/esiglpart11.htm 
31  http://www.abanet.org/scitechlec/isc/ 
dsg_tutorial.html 
32 http://www.ilpf.org/work/ca/draft.htm 
including
33
.  This  procedure  enables  the 
Commission,  and  the  Member States,  to 
identify those rules  which,  once adopted, 
will create Internal Market obstacles, and 
to  take  appropriate  action,  either issuing 
comments,  a  detailed  opinion  or  by 
proposing Community measures. 
o  It  will  be  important  to  distinguish 
"authentication  and  integrity  services" 
from  "confidentiality  services",  because 
different  rules  and  goals  separate,  as 
identified above, these two aspects. 
Potential  impacts  on  trade  and 
competitiveness  will  also  be  important 
considerations. 
(ii)  The  Dual-Use  Regulation  should  be 
adapted  in  view of the  requirements  for the 
cryptographic  products  market.  Article  19 
imposing  national  controls  also  contains  a 
provision  to  re-examine  the  need  for these 
controls within  three  years  from  the  date of 
entry of the Regulation (by the end of 1997). 
Therefore, when  the Dual-Use Regulation  is 
reviewed it could be improved by: 
o  progressively  dismantling  intra-
Community  controls  on  commercial 
encryption  products  (i.e.  not  necessarily 
for very advanced encryption); 
o  launching a discussion on  the scope and 
interpretation  of certain  provisions,  such 
as the so-called "General Software Note" 
(stipulating that public domain software is 
not subject to controls); 
o  dealing  with  problems  like  intangible 
means of transmission (e.g.  transmission 
of technology by fax or e-mail). 
(iii)  To  create  an  appropriate  and  balanced 
regulatory framework within the  Community, 
the  Commission  invites  and  supports 
Member States to  enhance  co-operation  of 
police  forces  on  a  European  and 
international level. 
(iv) Given the global dimension of electronic 
communication and commerce,  international 
agreements  may  be necessary between the 
Community  and  other  countries,  once  a 
harmonised  system  has  been  put  in  place. 
The  goal  must  be  to  remove  existing 
obstacles  in  order  to  create  an 
internationally  compatible  framework  for 
electronic  commerce,  in  particular  to 
33 Council Directive 83/189/EEC, 28.3.831aying down a 
procedure for the provision of information in the field of 
technical standards and regulations; OJ L  109, 26.4.83 
17 establish  commor  technical  standards  and 
mutual recognition of certificates. 
(v) The Council is also invited to initiate a 
debate on encryption issues. 
3. Ate:<C@MI}il~ll'i)flll'i\2)  li"ifi®~~lllli'®S 
(i) lnieroperability 
lnteroperability  between  different encryption 
and  digital  signature  applications  and 
systems  is  absolutely  necessary  to  ensure 
that  they  can  be  applied  in  and  outside 
Europe.  Services  are  mostly  achieved  by 
agreed  standards  including  test criteria  and 
procedures covering  protocols,  data formats 
and program interfaces. 
By  using agreed  protocols and  data formats 
it  is  not  necessary  to  develop  gateway 
services  or  conversion  programs  changing 
one  format to  another.  lnteroperability  in  a 
broader  sense  also  means  that  application 
solutions  can  be  moved  from  one  type  of 
software  and  hardware  environment  to 
another  (portability)  and  that  users  can 
move  from  one  place  to  another  and  still 
access the same trusted services (mobility). 
Examples for work on standards: 
o  The  most widely known  format of certificates 
is X.509 v3 34. 
o  The  Secure  Elect·onic  Transactions  (SET) 
standard  is  a protc.col  used  by  industry  and 
designed to safely transmit sensitive personal 
and  financial  information  over  public 
networks. 
o  At  the  international  level,  the  Internet 
Engineering  Task  Force  (IETF) 35, 
ISO/ITU 36  and  the  World  Wide  Web 
Consortium  0f'J'C)  37  are  working  on 
standards  concerning  public  key 
infrastructure,  certificates  and  digital 
signatures . 
In  order  to  meet  the  legal  and  market 
requirements,  technical  and  management 
standards  developed  in  an  open,  market-
driven  manner  are  needed  to  support 
34 The v3 version has built-in additional extension 
fields, which can convey additional subject 
identification, key attribute or policy information. It is 
still necessary to specify a profile for use of the 
extensions tailored for the Internet. 
35 Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509),ftp://ds.internic. 
net/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-ipki3cmp-04.txt 
36 X500 and IS09594 series: 
ftp:llftp.bull.com/pub/OSidirectory/ITU 
37  W"C Digital Signature Initiative, 
http://W\WJ.VJ3.org/Security/DSig/Overview.html 
interoperability.  fVlanagement standards can 
be  helpful  for  the  operation  of  CAs. 
Technical  standards  are  for  instance 
necessary  for  digital  signature  and 
certificate  formats  as  well  as  for  time-
stamping  services  and  smart  cards. 
Standards  must  correspond  to  the  best 
current practice. 
The  Commission  encourages  industry  and 
international  standards  organisations  to 
develop  technical  and  infrastructure 
standards  for  digital  signatures  and 
encryption to ensure secure and  trustworthy 
use  of networks  and  respect  privacy  and 
data  protection  requirements38•  The 
Commission will consider specific mandates 
on standardisation and  propose, in close co-
operation  with  the  Member States,  industry 
as  well  as  the  user  community  (business, 
consumers,  citizens)  measures  which  will 
support the work in this field. 
(ii) Support progr~mme 
The  Commission  is  ready  to  support  the 
development  of  cryptographic  services,  in 
particular  it  is  considering  proposing  a 
Council  and  Parliament  Decision  for  an 
INFOSEC  II  programme  building  on  the 
INFOSEC programme carried out from  1992 
until  1994
39
.  The  programme  could  aim  at 
developing overall strategies for the security 
of  electronic  communication,  in  particular 
with  a view to  provide  users  and  producers 
of electronic communication with appropriate 
protection systems. 
(iii) Research projects 
The  Commission  will  continue  the  current 
projects in  the field of digital signatures and 
encryption  within  the  4th  framework 
programme  for  Community  activities  in  the 
field  of  research  and  technological 
development  (1994  - 1998)  [see  Annelt  1\/ 
for a list of ongoing projects] and will launch 
new  projects  within  the  5th  framework 
programme  (1998  - 2002).  Notably  the 
proposal  for the  5th  framework  programme 
foresees  a  key  action  on  electronic 
commerce.  Special  importance  will  be 
attached  to  techniques  a1m1ng  at 
interoperability  and  enhancing  privacy,  to 
stimulating best practice and encouraging its 
widescale deployment. 
38  see Bonn Ministerial declaration, footnote 6 
"http://www.cordis.lu/infosec/src/i!sede2.htm 
18 (iv)  The  use  oi  clligii:al  signati:ures  and 
encryption by public a~uthorities 
In  the  near  future,  government 
administrations  will  use  digital  signatures 
and  encryption  for  internal  purposes  or  in 
their  relations  with  business  and  citizens. 
Such  use  may  require  adaptations  to 
national  as  well  as  Community  laws, 
regulations  and  administrative  procedures. 
The  first Community  Regulation
40  has  been 
modified in order to allow the use of digitally 
signed electronic documents.  The impact of 
national  measures  has  to  be  monitored  in 
order  to  identify  problem  areas  which  may 
require  a Community  intervention.  Also the 
Union's  institutions  will  use  digital 
signatures
41  and encryption. 
(v) European intemei:-Forum 
The  Commission  will  create  by  the  end  of 
1997  an  electronically  based  European 
Internet-Forum  as  a  means  to  exchange 
information  on  the  regulatory  and  user 
aspects of digital signatures and encryption. 
(vi)  lnternal:io~l!ll hearing 
The  Commission  intends  to  organise 
beginning of 1998 a hearing  about the topic 
"digital signature and encryption". The aim is 
to  consult  governments,  industry  and 
consumers on which measures they feel the 
Community should take into consideration in 
order to 
- enhance the trust in  legally valid  and  user-
friendly  digital  signatures  as  well  as  in 
secure communication; 
- abolish identified Internal Market obstacles 
related  to  provision  and  free  circulation  of 
cryptographic goods and services; 
- provide  adequate  protection  of privacy  of 
individuals and their personal data. 
40 Council Regulation (EC) N" 1290/97, 27.6.97 
amending Regulation (EEC) N' 1408/71 on the 
application of social security schemes to employed 
persons. to self-employed persons and to members of 
their families moving within the Community and 
Regulation (EEC) N' 574/72 laying down the procedure 
for implementing Regulation (EEC) N' 1408/71 
OJ L 176, 4.7.97, P.  1 insertion of a new paragraph in 
Article 85 ensuring that documents exchanged by 
electronic means are given the same status as paper 
documents 
41  SINCOM, the budget management application of the 
Commission, introduces smart cards for digital 
signatures purposes 
4.  Time1~rame  ~or Comm~ni~  fllCfrioru 
4.0./1997:  European  lnternet.Foru.~·, 
4.0./1997:  Commission proposal to amehd the 
Dual-Use Regulation  ·  · 
1.0.11998:  International hearing 
1.0.11998:  Assessment of the comtw)nts on 
·. ttie 'Communicg\ion,  t~m r  3Suit;;  of 
the Internet-Forum and the 
· international hearing 
. 2.0.11998:  Propo~al  for further action (e.g. 
Directive on digital signatures) 
2;Q.f.1998;·  Proposal for ali lnfos~ II'  .·. · ' 
·  ..  programme  ·  ·  '·:·"  ··< ··. 
1998-2002: Projects within the 5th framework 
·  programme 
by 2000:  Common framework for ·  .,  . 
cryptography put in place. throughout 
the" Union  ~  .  >. 
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digital  signature  system  will  consist  of  two  parts:  on  one  hand  a  method  to  sign  a 
document  in  a "not  forgery"  way  and  on  the  other  hand  a  method  to  verify  that  the 
signature was generated  by  whom  it  represents.  The  authentication  protocols  can  be 
based  on  public  key  encryption  systems  (using  asymmetric  cryptographic  algorithms). 
For  a  detailed  description  of symmetric  and  asymmetric  cryptographic  algorithms  see 
Anrte}{ II. 
A digital signature is a s~ring of data created by using a private key.  A public key can be 
used to  verify that the  signature was  effectively generated  by  using the  corresponding 
private key.  It should be created in such a manner that it is impossible to create a valid 
signature  without  knowing  the  private  key.  The  authentication  of strings  of data  is  a 
process where the receiver of,  for instance,  a digital message can  be  assured about the 
origin of a  message. 
The  s1ring  oi'  da~a can  also  contain  pseudonyms  or  names  to  be  used  to  read  the 
identity  of the  sender.  In  addition  the  string  can  carry  a timestamp  to  testify  that  a 
message (or document) existed at the stated time. 
Digital signatures can also be used to certify that a certain public key belongs to a certain 
person. 
In  order  to  create  a  digital  signature,  two  steps  are  necessary.  First  the  sender 
compu~es wi~h the  help of software  a  diges1  of the  data  containing  its  essential 
characteristics (so-called "hash function":  a sort of short version of the data).  Unlike the 
procedure  when  encrypting  data  to  preserve confidentiality, he encrypts the digest -
together with additional data, including place and time of the signature -wnth his prova~e 
key and not with the public key of the receiver.  Thus, the key does not serve to encrypt 
the  plaintext  itself,  but  only  to  encrypt  the  digital  signature  that  is  annexed  to  the 
readable data [for a detailed description see Anne}{ i~]. 
With the help of the sender's public key the receiver can  find  out whether the data has 
been altered.  Technically speaking three steps are necessary: firstly, the public key  of 
the  sender is  used to  decrypt the  digital  signature and  thus the digest. Secondly, the 
digest  of the  plaintext  will  be  computed  again  by  software. ll"hordly,  both  computed 
digests  are  compared.  Even  the  smallest  change  of  the  data  would  result  in  two 
diverging digests and therefore be discovered immediately (see Fig.  1  ). 
Thus, the  recipient of the  data can  now be  sure that the transmitted data has not been 
altered and that the public and private key of the sender are a complementary key-pair. 
;/.2 =;i~=~~~rey  .  ~J~ 
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Fig. 1  Digital signaturs 
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Hash  functions  are  used  to  compute  a  data  digest  when  making  digital  signatures. 
These functions map the data to fixed sized  hash values in  such a way that it would be 
extremely difficult to come up with a string of data that would match these particular hash 
values.  The  idea  is  based  on  the  fact  that a message digest represents  concisely the 
'original' data from which it was computed.  It could be considered as a digital fingerprint 
of the  'larger'  data  string.  As  hash  functions  are  a lot  faster than  the  all  data  signing 
functions it is  a lot more efficient to compute a digital signature by using the digest than 
using all the data. 
To use the hash functions for digital authentication they must have certain properties to 
make  them  secure  enough  for  cryptographic  usage.  It  must  be  excluded  that  a  data 
string can be found that hashes to a given value and that two distinct data strings hash to 
the  same  values.  Cryptographic hash  algorithms  produce  hash  values  of at  least  128 
bits. 
To  break  into  a  digital  signature  system  attacks  may  or  will  be  directed  at  the 
mathematical  string  used  by  the digital  signature system  or the  hash  function  used  to 
make the data digest.  In  order to  obtain an  adequate security level it  seems necessary 
to  choose  a digital  signature  system  and  a  hash  function  that  are  evenly  matched  in 
difficulty to break.  Attacks will take place on the weakest of both components. Therefore 
long modules and hash functions producing longer data digests should be used. 
Examples:  Message  Digest-algorithms  MD2,  MDS  (128-bit  values),  Secure  Hash 
Standards/Algorithms (SHS/SHA) and RIPEM 160. 
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Fig. 2  HSJsh 1unc'lion 
il.P  A unique cryptographic key pair is given or generated by the user. 
il.P  A string of data  is prepared by the sender on a computer. 
il.P  The  sender  prepares  a  "data  digest",  using  a  secure  hash  algorithm.  Digital  signature 
creation  uses  a hash  result derived  from  and  unique  to  both  the  signed  data and  a given 
private key. 
U  The sender encrypts the data digest with  his private key.  The private key  is  applied to the 
data  digest  text  using  a  mathematical  algorithm.  The  digital  signature  consists  of the 
encrypted data digest. 
U  The sender attaches his digital signature to the data or sends it separate. 
U  The sender sends  electronically  the  digital signature and  the  (not-encrypted  or encrypted) 
data to the receiver. 
U  The  receiver  uses  the  sender's  public  key  to  verify  the  sender's  digital  signature. 
Verification using the sender's public key proves that the data came from the sender. 
U  The receiver creates a "data digest" of the data, using the same secure hash algorithm. 
U  The receiver compares the two data digests.  If they are exactly the same (without a "bit" of 
difference) the receiver knows that the data has not been altered after it was signed. 
U  The  receiver obtains a certificate from  a Certification Authority  (or from  the  sender of the 
data).  It confirms  the  digital  signature  on  the  sender's  data.  The  certificate  contains  the 
public  key  and  name  or  pseudonym  of the  sender  (and  eventual  additional  information), 
digitally signed by the certification authority . 
iii As  the  TCP/IP  (Transmission  Control  Protocol/Internet  Protocol)  was  not  designed  to 
offer secure  communication  services  over the  Internet  (the  Internet  Protocol  version  6 
currently  under  development,  will  include  some  security  oriented  features)  additional 
security technologies are needed to tackle the increasing security concerns. 
Secure  electronic  infrastructures  are  mainly  based  on  SSL  (Secure  Sockets  Layers), 
SET  (Secure  Electronic Transactions)  and  S/MIME  (Secure  Multipurpose  Internet Mail 
Extensions).  These  industry-standard  protocols  provide the basis  for a wide  variety  of 
security  services  (digital  signatures,  message  integrity  verification,  authentication  and 
encryption). 
The  most  commonly  used  browsers  (Netscape  Navigator  and  Microsoft  Internet 
Explorer) exploit most of these possibilities together with the use of SSL-capable servers 
from  the  leading  vendors.  Additional  security features  requested  by  specific computer 
applications  can  be  incorporated  by  other  API  (Application  Program  Interface),  Java 
scripts, Java-applets,  Visual Basic, C/C++ or other programming languages.  _ 
*** 
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Encryption  is  the  transformation  of data  into  a form  unreadable  by  anyone  without  a 
decryption  key.  Cryptographic  algorithms  are  used  to  transform  plaintext  data  into 
encrypted  data.  The  act  of  transforming  the  information  is  called  The  process  of 
transforming data back into plaintext is  called decryption.  The purpose of encryption is 
to ensure confidentiality by keeping the information hidden from anyone for whom it is not 
intended,  even  for  those  who  can  see  the  encrypted  data.  It  addresses  the  data 
protection  and  privacy  issues,  including  data  integrity  and  confidentiality,  and  allows 
secure communication over insecure channels. 
There are two basic types of encryption: symmetric and asymmetll'ic. 
In symmeti'ic encryption systems one key is used both to encrypt and  decrypt data.  To 
provide security for the information, the key needs to be kept as a secret between parties 
involved.  Symmetric encryption is suitable for transforming large amounts of data since 
computations  are  performed  rapidly.  Management of the  distribution  and  use  of the 
secret key is critical as the key is vulnerable in transit to the other party. 
Examples of symmetric algorithms: the Data Encryption Standard (DES} algorithm,  Fast 
Encryption Algorithm  (FEAL),  International Data  Encryption Algorithm  (IDEA),  RC4  and 
RCS,  Secure and Fast Encryption Routine (SAFER} 
Romeo  Juliet 
(Knows secre~ key)  (Knows secret keyE 
Decryption Blgmithm 
Fig. 3  Symmetric encryption 
v Asymme~rnc encryption  systems  are  based  on  the  use  of  two  keys  in  a  single 
cryptographic o;.;eration:  one key to encrypt, another key to decrypt.  The encryption key 
is  called  the  public  key,  the  decryption  key  is  called  the  private  key.  These  keys  are 
related in  a complex way.  A message encrypted with a particular public key can only be 
decrypted by  using the corresponding private key;  like data encrypted with a private key 
can only be decrypted by using the corresponding public key. 
Examples: the RSA public key algorithm, Diffie-Hellmann. 
The private key should be stored securely in  a protected medium such as asmartcard, a 
portable computer or a smartdisk.  The most common hardware solution will probably be 
the  smartcard  as  the  private  key  cannot  be  separated from  the  card  and  is  difficult to 
copy.  In  addition  the  use  of smartcards  can  be  protected,  for example  using  a  PIN-
number  or a  finger  print  matching  technique.  The  public  key,  as  the  name  already 
indicates, is published and accessible to everyone.  Therefore asymmetric algorithms are 
often called public-key algorithms. 
Example:  If someone, say Romeo, wants to send a confidential message using a public-
key mechanism to someone else,  say Juliet,  he needs to encrypt theplaintext,  probably 
something like "I  love you",  with  her public key.  He could  send the encrypted message 
safely  over  an  unsecured  network  as  only  Juliet  can  decrypt  the ciphertext  with  her 
private key.  Thus,  public-key cryptographic systems open the use of encryption to huge 
user groups. 
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vi A major disadvantage of asymmetric algorithms is that they are significantly slower than 
symmetric algorithms.  This disadvantage can  be overcome by  using a combination of 
botll'i  a!goro~hms in order to create a so-called dligita! envelope. 
The  plaintext  is  encrypted with  a fast  symmetric algorithm  using  a  relatively  short but 
nevertheless secure  key.  Additional  security  is  provided  if the  key  is  only  used  once 
(message  or session  key)  and  irrecoverably destroyed as  soon  as  the  communication 
ends.  Only this  key  needs  to.  be  encrypted  with  the  public  key  of the  receiver.  For 
example,  Romeo sends  both ciphertext and encrypted session  key to Juliet.  By using 
her private key to decrypt the session key Juliet is able to decrypt the full ciphertext. 
Example: Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) uses IDEA and RSA 
Digital envelope 
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Fig 5. Digiial envelope 
In  theory,  some  keys  could  be  found  on  the  basis  of systematic  trials  ("brute-force" 
attacks).  However the length of the l<ey can be determined in  such a way that the code 
could not be cracked within a practically feasible time period. 
In  an  asymmetric,  or public  key,  cryptographic  system,  keys  with  a  length  of 1,024 bits  are 
considered to be secure  at present. This corresponds to a string of more than 300 digits. Using 
today's computer technology,  such  keys would  take  centuries to  crack.  In  a symmetric system 
like DES or IDEA, keys of 56  to  128 bits provide similar protection as a 1  ,024-bit public key. 
vii Encryption  is  also useful for electronically stored  information  as  it  can  not be  excluded 
that unauthorized persons like computer hackers gain access to  data.  As  some kind  of 
data  needs  to  be  stored  securely  for  long  time  periods,  effective crypto-systems  are 
necessary, using appropriate key lengths. 
Such  storage  keys  have the  same  importance  as  the  stored  data.  For this  reason  it 
could be useful to make sure that the key can be recovered in case of loss,  for instance if 
the  owner of the  key  dies,  an  employee  leaves  the  company  with  the  key,  etc.  For 
secure communication such a key recovery mechanism is  not necessary.  If a message 
is lost during the transmission, the simplest way is to send it again, encrypted with a new 
key. 
There is no general theory to design absolute secure systems or to assess with scientific 
reliability their degree  of security.  Hackers  will  try  to  find  vulnerabilities  in  systems  to 
avoid  costly  brute-force  attacks  (e.g.  people  that  disclose  information,  failure  in  the 
algorithm,  electromagnetic  radiation  emanating  from  computer  screen,  etc.).  Given 
enough  resources,  time  and  skills,  almost any  system  can  be  broken.  The economic 
logic behind security is to  make a system more difficult and expensive to  break than the 
effort  would  be  worth  to  hackers.  As  a  result,  there  are  different  levels  of security 
precautions, from simple passwords to very strong encryption.  As any system is only as 
secure as  its weakest link,  systems security therefore needs to  be continually analysed 
and adapted. 
Data can be  hidden using steganography.  These methods reduce the chance of certain 
data being detected.  If that data is also encrypted it gives an additional layer of security. 
The word steganography literally  means "covered  writing".  It  includes  a vast  array  of 
methods of secret communications that conceal  the very  existence  of the hidden  data. 
Among these methods are  invisible inks, microdots,  character arrangement (other than 
the cryptographic methods of permutation and substitution), covert channels and spread-
spectrum communications. 
In  contrast  to  cryptography,  where  the  "enemy"  can  detect,  intercept  and  modify 
messages  without  being  able  to  violate  certain  security  premises  guaranteed  by  a 
cryptosystem, the goal of steganography is to  hide the wanted secret data in  other data 
in such a way that it doesn't allow anybody to even detect that there is some hidden data 
present.  It is not intended to replace encryption systems but it provides a supplementary 
difficulty for data to  be  cracked.  These methods are no  longer limited to  embed text in 
images but can also be used for other media like voice, video etc. 
*** 
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Key  escrow  and  key  recovery  systems  are  encryption  systems  providing  a  backup 
decryption capability allowing  authorised  institutions under certain  conditions to decrypt 
data  using  information  supplied  by  one  or more  Trusted  Third  Parties  (TIPs - trusted 
means trusted by both sides, the user and the government agency). 
··J  •  '  ·•, 
In  a  ~ey escrow system  a  copy  of  any  secret  key  generated  is  deposited  with  an 
authorised TIP.  The  key  could  also  be  split into two  or  more parts that  are  deposited 
with different TIPs.  In  accordance with  national law TIPs would  have to  hand  over the 
key to the competent government agencies. 
Once a copy of a private key  is handed over to a third party,  this  key  can  no longer be 
regarded  as  fully  secret.  All  communications  and  stored  data  encrypted  with  this  key 
could eventually be decrypted. 
Within  a key  i'®covery  system  the  private  key  would  not  be escrowed  right  from  the 
beginning.  The  encryption  system  would  allow  authorised  organisations,  such  as 
licensed TIPs, to rebuild the key on request. 
Once the key is rebuilt through a key recovery system the result is the -same as if the key 
would  have  been  escrowed.  Therefore  a  key  recovery  system  would  only  make  a 
difference  if  exclusively  session  keys  (a  key  which  is  only  used  once  and  normally 
irrecoverably  destroyed  as  soon  as  the  communication  ends)  were  recoverable.  But 
even  in  such  a key  recovery  system TIPs would  theoretically  be  able  to  decrypt a// 
session keys. 
Technically  both  schemes  allow  access to  all  encrypted  information.  Consequently the 
difference depends essentially on the institutional arrangements set by national law. 
*** 
ix 20563  E2S{SW):  The  goal  of the  project  is  to  contribute  to  the  growth  of Electronic 
Commerce  on  the  Internet  by  developing,  testing  and  installing  end-to-end  security 
mechanisms  for  commercial  transactions  using  the  Internet.  The  plan  is  to  deliver  a 
professional infrastructure that is  attractive to  businesses and  consumers,  enabling the 
economic grovvth promised by the "information society". 
22005  WIRE{SW):  The  overall  goal  of  the  WIRE  project  is  to  make  it  possible  for 
organisations to deploy  Secure Enterprise Webs.  Today,  many  organizations  have  set 
up  Web servers  for  non  strategic  IT  applications  to  deliver  public  information  to  the 
market  at  a  low  cost  compared  to  advertisement  in  other  media.  This  current  WEB 
technology is successful when data is  public (access control is  not required),  small (less 
than  thousands  of  pages)  and  simple  (text,  numbers,  built-in  .gif  images).  These 
conditions  are  too  restrictive  for  professional  applications.  Commercial  transactions 
require strong support for user authentication and access control. 
24"!03  FACTililERCHANT(TBP):  The  pilot  will  demonstrate  the  integration  of  secure 
billing, e-mail and EDI  on  a platform, which provides comprehensive access to business 
information.  This will  include  news  and  rates,  world-wide  market  and  broker research, 
and financial  and credit analysis. The pilot will  be  run  over Internet for access for both 
SMEs and larger organizations. The pilot will use knowledge-based systems technology 
for  search,  public-key  cryptography  and  digital  signatures  for  confidentiality, 
authentication, integration and non-repudiation. 
22803  ICX  {TBP):  A  business  driven  European  User  Group,  to  be  known  as  the 
International Commerce eXchange (ICX), is proposed. ICX will be a European Forum for 
the  discussion,  identification  and  subsequent  resolution  of  security  issues  in  the 
electronic commerce arena. 
9801  WEBCORIE(SW): The W3C is an  international industry consortium which seeks to 
promote standards for the evolution of the Web and interoperability between World Wide 
Web  ('I'NVVV)  products  by  producing  specifications  and  reference  software.  Although 
W3C  is  funded  by  industrial  members,  it  is  vendor-neutral,  and  its  products  are  freely 
available  to  all.  In  early  1993,  W3C  identified  digital  signature to  be  one  of the  major 
market drivers for Web security and launched the so called Digital Signature Initiative. 
o  PROJIECTS iN "~TANDARIOISATiOM  AND THIIE iNIFOIRMATION SOCi!ETV'' 
C-SET {Interoperable Chip-securecll Electronic TrUllnsaction) 
As the  need for Electronic Commerce emerges,  Visa  and MasterCard have developed 
the  SET (Secure  Electronic  Transaction)  protocol  to  secure  payment transactions  on 
open networks by  software. Worldwide card schemes will mostly apply to  SET payment 
regulations according to which the merchant is  not paid  if the cardholder repudiates the 
Jl 
X transaction.  Some regional card schemes,  such as CB ar1d Banksys, enjoy a high level 
of security in domestic face-to-face payments thanks to the use of the micro-circuit card. 
They wish to enhance SET so as to support the use of microcircuit cards, thus providing 
the additional security needed to fully guarantee payments over open networks. 
o  f!l~OJ~C1S.  ~~·1&-n~ ACIFS  fil~OGMitJU'. 
AC02G SEMIF'IER 
Background  Networked  information  systems  are experiencing  a tremendous growth in 
terms of users and traffic as well as publicity.  The dominating application is the Internet-
based  World  Wide  Web  (WWW),  with  its  potential  of 3  million  connected  individual 
computers  and  an  order of magnitude  more  actual  users.  WWW is  still  dominated  by 
free-of-charge  information  systems,  but this  is  expected  to change  dramatically in  the 
near future.  WWW will be used for all sorts of electronic commerce and trade, like online 
offering,  ordering,  payment,  and  delivery  of  services,  information,  and  exchange  of 
business documents. The same development can be expected for the IBC networks and 
"Information Highways." 
o  ~~OJIEC1S  ON  ~ECUI'ini'V Of  1~liECOMM~.H\luCA1iONS  AND  iNfO~rul#.l'iJUON 
SV~l[Htfls  .  .  .  . 
ln~erwo1r~ing p!.llbiic key ceiii~ica~ioru in1rastruciure for Eull'Ope (ICE-TIEl) 
The  aim  of  ICE-TEL  is  to  increase  the  trustworthiness  of  the  Internet  as  used  by 
industrial  and  academic  research.  The  project  will  support  security-enhanced 
applications by providing users with public key certification services in  several European 
countries. It will also incorporate a security infrastructure and user platform to adapt and 
integrate the necessary tools and toolkits for incorporating public key-based security into 
applications as  WWW,  e-mail,  electronic directories  and  multimedia conferencing.  The 
three project applications selected for tools validation will involve secure communication 
between  national  computer  emergency  response  teams  and  other  network  support 
groups, public administrations and protected access to electronic directories. 
Multimeolia~ IEumiPeaJn  Resea~rch confeu-ence  integra~tion (rtiHERCI) 
The  purpose of MERCI  is  to  support joint research  and  technological  development by 
deploying  better tools  for multimedia  collaboration  in  Europe.  Existing toolsets will  be 
made easier for untrained personnel to use,  with  better quality audio,  video and  shared 
workspace  facilities,  and  better  support  for  multimedia  applications  in  conferences. 
Distributed measurement, monitoring and control will be another important feature, as will 
improve privacy  in  conferencing.  Verification,  both  within  MERCI  and  other telematics 
projects,  will  include  regular  research  seminars  and  industrial  trials  with  commercial 
organisations. 
xi 
32-Direc~ory lbasediED! certificate access and management (DIEDICA) 
DEDICA  plans to  offer  EU  electronic  data  interchange  (EDI)  operators  in  sectors  like 
banking, data security arrangements for them to network with so-called open system and 
distributed  services,  like  electronic  mail,  which  at  present  rely  on  different  security 
standards. The proposal will involve mal<ing the certification infrastructure now employed 
for authenticating electronic messages in open systems compatible with EDI certification. 
A shared infrastructure will result in  economies of scale for service providers, satisfy the 
global service needs of EDI  operators and give e-mail users secure access to EDI. 
Trustwor\thy health telematncs (Tmsthea~th) 
In  TRUSTHEAL  TH,  a network of bona fide national organisations working  in  health care 
computerisation will  show how openly-linked  European telematics  systems can  employ 
modern data security measures. Based on a 1994 EU user survey, the project will adopt 
coded  digital  signature  techniques  to  meet  legal  requirements  and  sustain  public 
confidence in  information security. Among  numerous urgent application  areas are drug 
prescriptions,  electronically  exchanged  laboratory  data  and  health  center  invoicing. 
Network  partners  will  collaborate  in  delivering  security  techniques  for  subsequent 
transfer to permanent health service operations. 
lmplememti1111g secure hea!thcare te!ematics applnca~ions in !Europe {~SHTAR) 
Tight precautions to  protect data in telematics-supported health services in  Europe are 
the central  concern  of ISHT  AR.  The  project will  set  up  an  expert group to  advise  and 
support  the  Commission  and  other  personnel  involved  in  security-sensitive  health 
telematics projects. Existing guidelines on protection will be reinforced and products and 
services  tested.  The  usefulness  of telematics  in  handling  the  technicalities  of  data 
security  will  also  be  demonstrated.  The  project  will  launch  publicity  to  heighten 
awareness of protection issues and also consider their legal and social implications. 
Data pll'otectuon in the IEL!ropea111  Union (DAPRO) 
The purpose of DAPRO is to structure and demonstrate the content of the July 1995 EU 
Data  Protection  Directive  as  a  basis  for  legal  regulation  of  expanding  telematics 
applications, and to  clarify its relation to Member State law in this field.  Both private and 
public  sectors  need  such  information,  including  case  law,  comments,  data  protection 
agency  addresses,  glossary  and  user guides,  which  will  be  published  in  an  electronic 
system  with  a  hypermedia  interface.  A  publishing  company  will  be  responsible  for 
implementing  and  marketing  the  system  which  will  facilitate  the  extension  of  data 
protection law to other Member States. 
xii The  aim  of the  project  is  to  investigate  operational  and  architectural  aspects  of TIP 
service provision: how a TIP should be  organized and operated iri order to provide TIP 
services effectively;  how different TIP systems may  be  combined or made to interwork 
together,  and  in  particular:  how  an  ESnTP  network  may  be  extended  to  provide 
confidentiality/key  recovery  services;  how  interworking  may  be  achieved  between 
heterogeneous TIP networks. 
Goal  of the project is to operate a pilot Certification Authority  (CA)/ Trusted Third  Party 
service. 
The emphasis of the pilot is on certification in  support of Eur~en  Internal Market:  how 
Is  it possible to  certify  business  oq  users,  to  support  secure  messaging  and  any  other 
communications services inside a country and across Europa. 
The project will try to define a key recovery scheme accepted by the commercial sector 
that aiso provides appropriate means for law enforcement 
~t  uses  a functionally  Trusted Third  Party  to  provide the  confidence needed for  a new 
electronic financial  negotiable instrument.  Designed  as  a generic solution to electronic 
negotiability, MANDATE will ultimately be built on tamper-resistant hardware, known as a 
DOC-carrier, and using public-key cryptography to provide the securi~y required. 
The study will establish an  experimental TIP, which will  act as  a service of certification 
for a group of lawyers, judges and prosecutors in their daily practice. 
1Eul1'omed-IETS 
The first objective of this project is using the experts' experiences and findings to identify, 
define  and  verify  operational,  technical,  regulatory  and  legal  aspects  of the TIPs for 
telemedical  applications  over  the  WWW.  The  second  objective  is  to  implement  the 
above adjusted findings in EUROMED's configuration, which is a telemedical application 
over the V\NIIW, with regards to effectiveness,  economics and acceptability. 
EAGLE will study commercial, technical and regulstory as~cts  o~ TIPs. 
xiii Additional information on  security and trust in electronic communications and related 
aspects can be found on the following Commission World Wide Web servers: 
ll'nliliiP :1/www. is[ll)o.cec.lbe 
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